Civility and Collegiality—Unreasonable Judicial Expectations for Lawyers as Officers of the Court? by Brown, Lonnie T.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
7-1-2012 
Civility and Collegiality—Unreasonable Judicial Expectations for 
Lawyers as Officers of the Court? 
Lonnie T. Brown 
University of Georgia, ltbrown@uga.edu 
 
Repository Citation 
Lonnie T. Brown, Civility and Collegiality—Unreasonable Judicial Expectations for Lawyers as Officers of 
the Court? , 2 St. Mary's J. Legal Malpractice & Ethics 234 (2012), 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/829 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ 
Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please contact 
tstriepe@uga.edu. 
BROWN_FINAL 6/26/2012 11:51 AM 
 
324 
ARTICLE 
Lonnie T. Brown, Jr. 
Civility and Collegiality—Unreasonable Judicial 
Expectations for Lawyers As Officers of the Court? 
 
Abstract. It is a well-settled and often-recited fact that lawyers are “officers 
of the court.”  That title, however, is notoriously hortatory and devoid of 
meaning.  Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit recently took the somewhat 
unprecedented step of utilizing the officer-of-the-court label to, in effect, 
sanction an attorney for the purportedly uncivil act of failing to provide 
defendant attorneys with pre-suit notice.  While the author applauds the 
court’s desire to place greater emphasis on lawyer-to-lawyer collegiality as a 
component of officer-of-the-court status, the uncertainty the decision creates 
in terms of a lawyer’s role will potentially force litigators to compromise 
important client-centered duties.  This Article argues that it would be 
preferable for courts to define sanctionable officer-of-the-court duties by 
reference to well-defined, existing procedural and ethical norms, thereby 
enhancing predictability and imbuing the label with much-needed substance. 
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
 
     We believe and defend the idea that maintaining a bar that promotes 
civility and collegiality is in the public interest and greatly advances judicial 
efficiency: better “to secure the just, speedy[,] and inexpensive determination 
of every action and proceeding,” as Rule 1 demands.1  
Incivility and discourtesy among lawyers—litigators in particular—have 
become perhaps the most popular sources of complaint and dissatisfaction 
for members of the bar.2  Indeed, hardball strategies and unpalatable 
theatrics are increasingly viewed as the norm rather than the exception.3  
Furthermore, while lawyers who engage in such behavior no doubt believe 
 
1. Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L. (Sahyers I), 560 F.3d 1241, 1244 n.5 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010).  The author of this 
quote, Judge Edmondson, also saw fit to include it in his opinion accompanying the denial of a 
request for rehearing en banc in the case.  Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L. (Sahyers II), 
603 F.3d 888, 891 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Edmondson, J., concurring). 
2. See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Deloitte & Touche, 501 N.W.2d 15, 19–20 (Wis. 1993) 
(“There is a perception both inside and outside the legal community that civility, candor, and 
professionalism are on the decline in the legal profession and that unethical, win-at-all-costs, 
scorched-earth tactics are on the rise.”); INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVILITY OF 
THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, 143 F.R.D. 371, 375 (1991) (“We learned there is 
widespread dissatisfaction among judges and lawyers at the gradual changing of the practice of law 
from an occupation characterized by congenial professional relationships to one of abrasive 
confrontations.”); NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A GOOD 
LIFE IN THE LAW 58 (2010) (remarking that one of the largest sources of discontent for lawyers is the 
incivility of other lawyers because the practice is rampant); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS 
OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 11 (2000) (observing that “[m]ost practitioners 
are unhappy with regulatory structures and with the incivility, hucksterism, and other misconduct 
that they seem powerless to prevent”); Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to be 
Civil: Defining Civility As an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 100 
(2011/2012) (maintaining that “the need to reclaim ‘civility’ in the practice of law has become a 
rallying cry in the profession”); Amy R. Mashburn, Making Civility Democratic, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 
1147, 1157 (2011) (noting the litigation climate “is perceived by most commentators to have 
continued to worsen, and lawyers and judges continue to complain of growing incivility”). 
3. See NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A GOOD LIFE 
IN THE LAW 59 (2010) (discussing two polls indicating that “69[%] of lawyers thought that civility 
in the profession had declined over time, and 80[%] of judges had observed uncivil attorney conduct 
in their courtrooms”).  In a recent article, Susan Daicoff stated:  
The vast majority of commentators generally agree that the level of “professionalism” displayed 
by attorneys has declined dramatically in the last twenty-five years . . . [as evidenced by] a 
decline in civility and courteous conduct between lawyers, an increase in unethical or uncivil 
behavior among lawyers and judges, frequent lapses of appropriate ethical and professional 
conduct, and increasingly aggressive, competitive, and money-oriented legal battles, fought with 
a “win at all costs” approach . . . .  
Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on 
Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1344 (1997). 
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that their “Rambo” tactics are effective for and desired by their clients,4 
the resulting negative impact on judicial efficiency is undeniable.5  
Consequently, the active promotion of the contrary ideals of civility and 
collegiality should be a welcomed initiative, right? 
In the abstract, the answer is surely “yes.”  However, when one considers 
the source of the statement of principle quoted above,6 as well as the 
specific circumstances that underlie its pronouncement, wholehearted 
endorsement becomes a more complicated proposition.  The quote is from 
Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L.,7 in which the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed a district court’s refusal to award a plaintiff mandatory 
attorney’s fees.  Specifically, the court found that the district court had 
properly exercised its inherent authority because plaintiff’s counsel had 
“made absolutely no effort . . . to inform [defendants] of [p]laintiff’s 
impending claim much less to resolve [the] dispute before filing suit.”8  
The genesis of this obligation in Sahyers was ostensibly a concern for 
“lawyer-to-lawyer collegiality and civility.”9  In particular, the defendants 
happened to be lawyers, and in the court’s view, suing fellow members of 
the bar without first affording them notice and an opportunity to respond 
 
4. See NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A GOOD LIFE 
IN THE LAW 59 (2010) (observing that “[s]ome lawyers perceive that playing hardball brings a 
strategic advantage”); Bronson D. Bills, To Be or Not to Be: Civility and the Young Lawyer, 5 CONN. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 31, 35–36 (2005) (“[T]oday many [lawyers] avow that civility is anachronistic or 
incompatible with the modern day practice of law . . . .  Some equate acting civilly with being a ‘push 
over,’ being ‘faint of heart,’ and ‘weak,’ while others proclaim that the only way to successfully litigate 
is through the use of aggressive and belligerent tactics.” (footnotes omitted)); Shawn Collins, Be 
Civil? I’m a Litigator!, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 20, 1999, at 21, 21 (arguing that being an effective advocate 
requires the opposite of civility). 
5. See FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, 143 F.R.D. 441, 445 (1992) (observing that “[a] lack of civility can escalate 
clients’ litigation costs while failing to advance their interests or bring them closer to their ultimate 
goal of ending disputes.  Time expended in ‘Rambo’-style discovery can hinder or prevent litigation 
parties from getting to the heart of the important contested issues.”); Marvin E. Aspen, Be Careful 
How You Tread, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at 16, 16 (asserting that “[c]onduct that may be 
characterized as uncivil, abrasive, abusive, hostile or obstructive impedes the fundamental goal of 
resolving disputes rationally, peacefully[,] and efficiently”); see also Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo 
Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 637 (1990) (remarking 
that experienced lawyers generally agree that use of Rambo tactics should be discouraged). 
6. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1244 n.5 (“We believe and defend the idea that maintaining a bar 
that promotes civility and collegiality is in the public interest and greatly advances judicial efficiency: 
better to ‘secure the just, speedy[,] and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding,’ as 
Rule 1 demands.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)). 
7. Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L. (Sahyers I), 560 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010). 
8. Id. at 1245. 
9. Id. 
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was neither collegial nor civil.  To make matters worse, plaintiff’s counsel’s 
lack of civility was not simply deemed an affront to his colleagues within 
the bar, as the court also stated that it “caused . . . the judiciary to waste 
significant time and resources on unnecessary litigation and stood in stark 
contrast to the behavior expected of an officer of the court.”10 
While Sahyers was undoubtedly intended to send a strong 
professionalism message to plaintiff’s counsel individually,11 the decision’s 
underlying reasoning cannot be so easily quarantined.  Rather, it is readily 
transferable to other litigation scenarios, which, at a minimum, creates the 
lingering possibility that pre-suit notice, or some other court-created 
obligation, could conceivably be required in all manner of cases.  As a 
result, Sahyers might very well be a harbinger for enhanced use of the 
officer-of-the-court mantra in the name of civility, collegiality, and judicial 
efficiency.12 
Admittedly, greater emphasis on attorneys’ professional obligations as 
officers of the court should redound to the collective benefit of the legal 
system and the profession.  The problem with such a strategy, however, is 
the uncertain and malleable nature of these obligations.13  More precisely, 
the officer-of-the-court label is frequently summoned by courts when they 
perceive that something more should be expected of an attorney than the 
 
10. Id. (emphasis added). 
11. The Eleventh Circuit attempted to circumscribe its decision by stating that the decision was 
fact-intensive.  See id. at 1246 (“We strongly caution against inferring too much from our decision 
today.  These kinds of decisions are fact-intensive.”). 
12. See infra Part V.C (describing the effects of utilizing a vague officer-of-the-court standard); 
cf. Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility As an 
Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 101 (2011–12) (discussing Sahyers as 
an example of the “increasing willingness of courts to sanction lawyers based solely on a lack of 
‘civility’”).  Another case in which a court recognized an unwritten and unforeseeable 
officer-of-the-court duty seemingly contrary to a lawyer’s client-centered obligations is Smith v. 
Johnston.  Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1263–64 (Ind. 1999) (holding that lawyers’ duties 
arise not only out of ethical rules but also from the fact that every lawyer is an officer of the court). 
13. See George A. Riemer, Officers of the Court: What Does it Mean?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug.–
Sept. 2001, at 27, 27 (contending that the officer-of-the-court label “is very ambiguous in meaning 
and gets in the way of understanding the source and scope of the ethical duties of lawyers” (citing 37 
Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 1251 (1976))); infra Part V.B (discussing various perspectives on the meaning of 
officer of the court); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 
39, 77 (1989) (observing that the conflict between a lawyer’s role as an officer of the court and the 
more definitive zealous advocacy duty “creates confusion and cynicism within the bar” (citing Heinz 
& Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. 
L. REV. 1111, 1140 (1978); E. Wayne Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to Report Other 
Lawyers’ Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95, 100)).  See generally 
James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of the Court”, 48 BUFF. 
L. REV. 349 (2000) (providing a thoughtful critique on the confusion generated by the officer-of-the-
court title). 
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behavior exhibited, and as Sahyers vividly indicates, judicial perceptions in 
this regard can vary depending upon the disposition of the 
decision-maker.14 
Although creating and enforcing professional duties in an ad hoc fashion 
might serve to keep lawyers on their ethical toes, the lack of predictability 
would, in the long run, unduly hamstring their ability to fulfill legitimate 
duties owed to clients.  Accordingly, this Article proposes a compromise 
that can achieve the intangible benefits that flow from an aspirational 
officer-of-the-court standard without the debilitating unpredictability.  
Namely, courts should exalt lawyers to live up to their higher, 
officer-of-the-court calling at appropriate times.  But to be valid, those 
instances should be directly traceable to well-defined, existing procedural 
or ethical norms.  
Part II lays the foundation for this proposal through a detailed analysis 
of the three stages of the Sahyers litigation: (1) the trial court’s initial 
decision;15 (2) the affirmance on appeal by the three-judge panel of the 
Eleventh Circuit;16 and (3) the denial of plaintiff’s request for a rehearing 
en banc.17  Each phase of the case exposes varying perspectives on the 
significance of the officer-of-the-court aspect of a lawyer’s role and its 
relationship to client-centered obligations. 
Part III then closely explores the Eleventh Circuit panel’s tenuous legal 
reasoning and reveals that it may portend far wider application than the 
court contemplated.  Specifically, the broad tenets of civility, judicial 
economy, and officer-of-the-court status transcend all litigation settings.  
Therefore, that professional station can be invoked by courts at-will, in the 
exercise of their inherent authority, to create pre-suit notice or other 
 
14. See Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility As 
an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 142 (2011–12) (“The legal 
profession is not well-served if civility continues to be a term whose meaning exists only in the eye of 
the beholder or whose tenets create obligations that are inconsistent with a lawyer’s preexisting 
professional obligations.”); infra Part II.C (discussing the concurring and dissenting opinions of 
Sahyers II).  Compare Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1261–62 (setting aside a default judgment based on 
plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to provide defense counsel with advance notice), with Sprung v. Negwer 
Materials, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 97, 100–01, 109 (Mo. 1989) (refusing to set aside a default judgment 
based on plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to advise defense counsel of the entry of a default judgment 
during the time within which that judgment would likely have been set aside as a matter of course), 
superseded by MO. R. CIV. P. 74.05, as recognized in Cont’l Basketball Ass’n v. Harrisburg Prof’l 
Sports Inc., 947 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
15. Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L., No. 8:07-cv-52-T-30MAP, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 112849 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2008). 
16. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1246. 
17. Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 889 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Edmondson, J., concurring). 
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unwritten duties.18 
Part IV proceeds to test the validity of the rationale underlying the 
Eleventh Circuit’s recognition of the notice obligation by comparing it to 
the bases for the widely-adopted formal pre-suit notice requirement in 
medical malpractice actions.  As Part IV demonstrates, the common 
foundational thread that runs through both sets of pre-filing notification 
directives is the desire for enhanced judicial efficiency.19  While this 
commonality seemingly bolsters the propriety of the Sahyerss pre-suit 
notice duty, the court’s approval of the ex post imposition of this 
requirement still raises unpredictability concerns not present in the clearly 
articulated medical malpractice notice scheme. 
Part V continues with an examination of the origins, evolution, and 
uncertain meaning of the officer-of-the-court label in America.  It then 
analyzes the potential effects of judges utilizing an imprecise 
officer-of-the-court model to create and enforce general behavioral norms 
within the profession and concludes that although some benefits would 
likely flow from this approach, it is more probable that it will foster over-
cautiousness on the part of litigators, chilling even legitimate zealous 
advocacy. 
In light of this, Part VI proposes, as an alternative, that courts place 
increased emphasis on the procedural and ethical proscriptions that 
currently exist for constraining excessive zeal and other forms of 
illegitimate advocacy, and tie those directly to the officer-of-the-court 
characterization, a tactic that some courts have already employed.20  Such 
 
18. But see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (recognizing the broad inherent 
authority of federal courts but emphasizing that courts invoking this power must “exercise 
caution . . . and . . . comply with the mandates of due process”). 
19. See, e.g., Rabatin v. Kidd, 281 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.) 
(describing the legislative intent of the notice requirement for medical liability actions as an incentive 
to reduce litigation costs and encourage settlement (citing State v. Sanchez, 135 S.W.3d 698, 699 
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2003), aff’d, 138 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004))). 
20. These courts determined that the behavior of the attorneys in question fell below certain 
defined norms for the profession, categorized as officer-of-the-court duties, namely, the dictates of 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 30, and 37, as well as various standards contained in the 
governing Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 8.4.  See GMAC 
Bank v. HTFC Corp., 252 F.R.D. 253, 256–57 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (relying upon the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Professional Conduct and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to sanction a lawyer for 
abusive behavior); Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 98 CIV 10175(JSM), 2002 WL 
59434, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002) (linking Rule 11 with an attorney’s officer-of-the-court 
duties); see also Amy R. Mashburn, Making Civility Democratic, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1163 
(2011) (reporting results of an empirical study of cases over a ten-year period addressing uncivil 
behavior by lawyers, which  revealed that “judges and disciplinary tribunals make reference to, and 
rely upon, a variety of legal provisions as sources of their authority to impose sanctions or penalties 
for incivility, discourteousness, and disrespect”); cf. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 61–72 (Kennedy, J., 
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a measured, transparent approach can serve to rein in uncivil and 
uncollegial behavior,21 while simultaneously adding important substance 
to the ill-defined officer-of-the-court ideal, which, in turn, will further the 
ultimate objective of making attorneys more cognizant of this critically 
important facet of their professional responsibility.22 
II.     SAHYERS V. PRUGH, HOLLIDAY & KARATINOS, P.L. 
A. District Court’s Decision 
Plaintiff Christine Sahyers worked as a paralegal for the law firm of 
Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos.23  After leaving her position, she retained 
counsel and filed suit against the firm and its named partners under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),24 contending that they had failed to 
properly compensate her for overtime work in violation of the Act.25  
Specifically, she maintained that defendants did not pay her at least 1.5 
times her standard hourly rate for hours worked in excess of her normal 
forty-hour workweek, as required by the FLSA.26  Notably, Sahyers’s 
counsel did not make a pre-filing demand on the defendants, nor did he 
make any attempt to inform them about Sahyers’s claim.27  Sahyers had 
expressly instructed her counsel simply to file the lawsuit, and he followed 
her instructions.28 
 
dissenting) (arguing that the lower court’s imposition of sanction solely pursuant to its inherent 
authority was not proper, given the existence of various statutes and rules of procedure that covered 
the misconduct in question). 
21. See Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility As 
an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 145–46 (2011–12) (arguing for the 
necessity of specificity in identifying particular civility-based obligations). 
22. In his comprehensive and authoritative treatment of the subject, Professor Eugene R. 
Gaetke exposed the definitional and substantive inadequacies of the officer-of-the-court designation.  
Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 40–48 (1989).  His 
primary mode of analysis consisted of a thoughtful examination of the then extant ethical rules and 
non-disciplinary obligations that could be categorized as officer-of-the-court duties.  Id. at 48–76.  
This analysis led him to conclude that the profession either needed to abandon use of the 
officer-of-the-court description or else imbue the phrase with true meaning by adopting clear rules of 
professional conduct that affirmatively subordinate the interests of lawyers and their clients to those 
of the legal system and the public.  Id. at 90–91.  Adoption of Professor Gaetke’s position would 
enhance the operation of the approach endorsed in this Article by expanding the obligations that are 
clearly identifiable as falling under the officer-of-the-court rubric. 
23. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010). 
24. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2006). 
25. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1243. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
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The parties’ efforts to settle the dispute were unsuccessful, seemingly 
because Sahyers sought substantial damages but refused to provide the 
defendants with any proof regarding the amount purportedly owed.29  
Nevertheless, following the close of discovery, defendants made an offer of 
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6830 in the amount 
of $3,500, which Sahyers accepted.31 
The trial court entered judgment in Sahyers’s favor and granted her 
leave to file a motion for attorney’s fees and costs.32  Defendants 
principally argued in response that Sahyers was not a prevailing party in 
the litigation and, therefore, was not entitled to any award under the 
FLSA.33  The district court rejected this contention and, as a result, 
acknowledged that the Act provided for a mandatory award of reasonable 
attorney’s fees to Sahyers.34  Despite this concession, the court observed 
that some cases involve “special circumstances” in which a reasonable fee 
amounts to “no fee” and concluded that Sahyers’s case fell into this 
category because of her counsel’s failure to provide any pre-suit notice to 
defendants.35  While the court stopped short of finding that a formal 
pre-suit demand letter is always required, it emphasized that:  
[T]he [p]laintiff’s lawyer did not even make a phone call to try to resolve the 
issue before filing suit.  The [d]efendant is a law firm.  Prior to filing suit in 
 
29. Id.  In addition, it is significant to note that during discovery plaintiff objected to providing 
defendants with any evidence regarding the total number of excess hours she purportedly worked.  Id. 
30. Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that:  
At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against a claim may serve on an 
opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs then accrued.  If, 
within 14 days after being served, the opposing party serves written notice accepting the offer, 
either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of service.  The clerk 
must then enter judgment.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 68(a). 
31. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1243.  Besides the $3,500, defendants’ offer of judgment also 
included any attorney’s fees and costs to which the court deemed that plaintiff was entitled.  Id. 
32. Id.  In her motion, Sahyers requested $13,800 in fees and $1,840.70 in costs.  Id.; see 
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (setting forth standards to determine award of attorney’s fees and costs in 
an FLSA action). 
33. Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L., No. 8:07-cv-52-T-30MAP, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 112849, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2008).  Specifically, defendants contended that their 
inclusion of a nonliability term in the offer of judgment, which Sahyers accepted, effectively 
amounted to an agreement that defendants were not liable for any wrongdoing.  Id.  Along the same 
lines, defendants maintained that the judgment entered by the district court was not on the merits 
and, hence, the legal relationship between the parties remained unchanged—i.e., there was no 
prevailing party.  Id. 
34. Id. at *4. 
35. Id. at *4–5. 
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this local area, it is still reasonable to pick up the phone and call another 
lawyer so it won’t be necessary to file suit.36  
Though the court may have been somewhat concerned with enforcing 
common courtesy amongst members of the bar,37 it is apparent that the 
court’s primary distress related to conservation of judicial time and 
resources.38  In the court’s view, pre-suit notice, under circumstances such 
as those involved here, might have completely obviated the need for a 
lawsuit.39  It is possible, the court remarked, that a defendant could 
unknowingly fail to compensate an employee for overtime and without a 
pre-action demand, would be denied the opportunity to voluntarily make 
restitution outside of litigation.40  The fact that defendants in this case 
were lawyers may have had some bearing on the court’s decision, but this 
seemed far less important than the judicial economy concern.41  In short, 
the court viewed an award of fees and expenses in the context of this case 
as tantamount to rewarding what it considered to have been “unnecessary 
litigation.”42 
Interestingly, Sahyers’s counsel’s only explanation for his failure to make 
the desired pre-suit demand was that “his client did not want him to.”43  
In response, the court pointedly reminded him that “the lawyer is the 
officer of the [c]ourt, not the client.”44 
B. Decision on Appeal 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit made it evident from the very first 
sentence that the case was “about the power of a district court to supervise 
the work of the lawyers who practice before it.”45  Sahyers I characterized 
the district court’s decision as having recognized an exception to the 
 
36. Id. at *5. 
37. See id. (observing that Sahyers’s attorney “did not even make a phone call” or any other 
reasonable effort to work with defendant’s counsel before initiating suit). 
38. See id. at *6 (“This [c]ourt refuses to reward unnecessary litigation.”). 
39. See id. (opining that pre-suit notice would have afforded the defendant an opportunity to 
pay the overtime shortage outside of litigation and to show “its good faith desire to . . . compensate 
the employee”). 
40. Id. 
41. See id. at *5–6 (observing that failure to afford the defendant a pre-suit opportunity to 
resolve the action subjects the defendant to additional costs and attorney’s fees and results in the 
devotion of judicial resources to unnecessary litigation). 
42. Id. at *6. 
43. Id. at *7. 
44. Id. (emphasis added).  The court added that it would “not permit lawyers to file 
unnecessary litigation and palm it off on their clients.”  Id. 
45. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010). 
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general rule under the FLSA, which mandates the award of reasonable 
attorney’s fees and expenses to prevailing plaintiffs.46  The basis for this 
exception, according to the court, was the trial court’s “inherent powers to 
supervise the conduct of the lawyers who come before it and to keep in 
proper condition the legal community of which the courts are a leading 
part.”47 
The court further maintained that these inherent powers “derive[] from 
a lawyer’s role as an officer of the court” and include “the authority to 
police lawyer conduct and to guard and to promote civility and collegiality 
among the members of its bar.”48  This forthright nod to the cultivation 
of behavioral norms ultimately proved pivotal to the court’s analysis, as it 
found plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to provide pre-suit notice to defendants 
to be contrary to these ideals.49 
Critical to this assessment was the fact that defendants were attorneys.  
In the court’s view, it was the height of incivility for plaintiff’s counsel to 
sue fellow members of the bar without affording them some type of 
forewarning and opportunity to respond.50  The court stated that:  
Plaintiff’s lawyer slavishly followed his client’s instructions and—without a 
word to [d]efendants in advance—just sued his fellow lawyers.  As the 
district court saw it, this conscious disregard for lawyer-to-lawyer collegiality 
and civility caused (among other things) the judiciary to waste significant 
time and resources on unnecessary litigation and stood in stark contrast to 
the behavior expected of an officer of the court.51  
As if this indictment of counsel’s behavior were not enough, the court 
also went so far as to deem his lack of pre-suit notice, under the 
circumstances, as rising to the level of bad faith.52  The court concluded 
that the trial court’s refusal to award any attorney’s fees or costs to plaintiff 
constituted a legitimate refusal “to reward—and thereby to encourage—
 
46. Id. at 1244 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 
1223 n.12 (11th Cir. 2007); Kreager v. Solomon & Flanagan, P.A., 775 F.2d 1541, 1542 (11th Cir. 
1985)). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991); In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 
1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990)). 
49. Id. at 1245. 
50. See id. at 1245 n.7 (“Plaintiff’s lawyer showed . . . no courtesy to his fellow lawyers.”). 
51. Id. at 1245 (footnote omitted). 
52. See id. at 1246 n.9 (“[E]ven if bad faith is required, we conclude that the conscious 
indifference to lawyer-to-lawyer collegiality and civility exhibited by [p]laintiff’s lawyer (per his 
client’s request) amounted to harassing [d]efendants’ lawyers by causing them unnecessary trouble 
and expense and satisfied the bad-faith standard.”). 
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uncivil conduct.”53 
After this strong endorsement of the district court’s perceived efforts to 
promote civility and collegiality, the court ended its opinion by 
ineffectually endeavoring to narrow its holding.  The Eleventh Circuit first 
cautioned against reading too much into the decision and stressed its 
fact-intensive nature.54  The court then awkwardly cabined its opinion in 
the following manner:  
 We put aside cases in which lawyers are not parties.  We do not say that 
pre-suit notice is usually required or even often required under the FLSA to 
receive an award of attorney’s fees or costs.  Nor do we now recommend that 
courts use their inherent powers to deny prevailing parties attorney’s fees or 
costs.  We declare no judicial duty.  We create no presumptions.  We 
conclude only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining 
to award some attorney’s fees and costs based on the facts of this case.55  
Notwithstanding all of these stultifying provisos, once the genie is out of 
the bottle, it cannot be restrained so easily, as the judges who dissented 
from the denial of plaintiff’s request for a rehearing en banc essentially 
maintained.56 
C. Denial of Request for Rehearing 
Following the Eleventh Circuit panel’s decision upholding the denial of 
attorney’s fees and costs, Sahyers requested a rehearing en banc.57  
Though denied, there was significant disagreement among several 
members of the court.58  Indeed, the author of the Sahyers I opinion, 
Judge J. L. Edmondson, felt compelled to issue a concurring opinion 
defending the panel’s holding and reasoning.59 
In responding to concerns that the court had improperly overridden the 
FLSA’s mandatory fee award provision, Judge Edmondson explained that 
 
53. Id. at 1245. 
54. Id. at 1246. 
55. Id. 
56. See Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 896 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Wilson, J., dissenting) 
(lamenting that Sahyers, in effect, created binding precedent that the mandatory attorney’s fees 
requirement under the FLSA is now subject to a discretionary exception). 
57. Id. at 889 (Edmondson, J., concurring). 
58. Compare id. at 890–91 (stating that the decision did not create a new rule and was needed 
to protect civility within the judicial system), with id. at 892 (Wilson, J. dissenting) (arguing that the 
panel’s decision created bad precedent and expressing doubts about its reasoning), and id. at 891–92 
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (opining that the district court exceeded its authority to sanction the attorney 
and ignored “the express mandate of Congress”). 
59. Id. at 889–91 (Edmondson, J., concurring). 
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the FLSA was not the exclusive law governing this case.60  In his view, the 
court’s “inherent powers supplement[] the FLSA statute to make up the 
whole of the applicable law.”61  According to him:  
When the outcome favors the plaintiff, fees shall be awarded unless the 
[d]istrict [c]ourt, in the reasonable exercise of its power to supervise lawyers 
in their practice in cases before the [c]ourt, determines that an award of fees 
(given the specific circumstances of a particular case) is not right—not right 
directly because of lawyer conduct related to the specific case.62  
Judge Edmondson went on to laud the importance of this inherent 
authority and to contend that courts should be reluctant to permit its 
dilution by the legislative branch.63  Although he somewhat grudgingly 
admitted that Congress could abrogate the court’s power to supervise 
lawyers, he maintained that it would have to do so “specifically, explicitly, 
and directly.”64 
Judge Edmondson, however, was quick to reiterate the narrowness of 
the court’s holding.  He stressed that neither the panel’s opinion nor the 
district court’s order created a procedural rule requiring pre-suit notice in 
FLSA cases, even when lawyers are suing individual lawyers.65  Though 
this observation may have been technically accurate, it seems relatively 
obvious that, going forward, a lawyer suing a fellow officer of the court 
under the FLSA would be foolish not to provide some sort of pre-litigation 
notification, certainly within the Eleventh Circuit, if not elsewhere.66 
More importantly, though, Judge Edmondson’s restatement of the 
decision’s limited reach does not in any way contract the broad inherent 
authority and officer-of-the-court monitoring apparatus that he and his 
fellow panel members endorsed.  Indeed, he revisited this foundational 
reasoning when he framed the district court’s decision as involving the 
supervision of lawyers and the promotion of mutual civility and respect.67  
 
60. Id. at 889. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 889–90. 
63. See id. at 890 (“Courts ought to be highly reluctant to cede this traditional power dealing 
with control of lawyer conduct in respect to cases that come before the [c]ourts . . . .”). 
64. Id.  Judge Edmondson also averred: “I believe that I am correct to say that Congressional 
abrogation of the [c]ourt’s inherent power to supervise lawyer conduct must be clear and plain, before 
the [c]ourts let that critical power get away.”  Id. 
65. Id. 
66. See id. at 896 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (observing that even though the opinion states it does 
not intend to create a new rule of pre-suit notice, “Sahyers is a published opinion, which makes it 
binding precedent in [the Eleventh Circuit]”). 
67. Id. at 890–91 (Edmondson, J., concurring).  Notably, to support the propriety of this 
approach, Judge Edmondson cited to a portion of the nonbinding Preamble to the Rules Regulating 
BROWN_FINAL 6/26/2012  11:51 AM 
2012] Civility and Collegiality—Unreasonable Judicial Expectations 337 
Judge Edmondson concluded with the same quote that begins this 
Article,68 underscoring the centrality for the public and the judicial system 
of “maintaining a bar that promotes civility and collegiality.”69 
Judge Edmondson’s efforts to constrain Sahyers, if anything, rendered 
the decision even more ominous.  Because rather than having a bright-line 
rule in the future to govern one’s behavior, lawyers are left to speculate as 
to whether other slightly different factual circumstances may give rise to a 
similar pre-suit notice obligation or some other type of unarticulated 
civility-based procedural requirement.70  The upshot is that litigators—at 
least within the Eleventh Circuit—must now contend with the looming 
prospect of being blindsided by the ad hoc recognition of 
officer-of-the-court duties that may conflict with obligations owed to their 
clients. 
In fact, that is precisely what happened to plaintiff’s counsel in this case, 
and what comprised the principal bone of contention for Judge Rosemary 
Barkett’s dissent from the rehearing denial.  In particular, given the panel’s 
characterization of the trial court’s denial of fees and costs as an “informal 
sanction,”71 Judge Barkett maintained that plaintiff’s counsel was entitled 
to some type of prior notice regarding the requirement of which he ran 
afoul.72  In Judge Barkett’s opinion, “[b]ecause Sahyers’[s] attorney was 
given no actual notice, the district court had no authority to sanction him 
for failing to contact the defendants or their lawyers before filing suit.”73  
Moreover, this lack of notice, in her view, was exacerbated by the fact that 
the district court’s exercise of inherent authority was in direct 
contravention of the FLSA’s mandatory fees and costs language,74 and 
 
the Florida Bar that encourages lawyers to demonstrate respect toward one another.  Id. at 890 (citing 
Preamble, RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR (1992)). 
68. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1244 n.5 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We believe and defend the idea 
that maintaining a bar that promotes civility and collegiality is in the public interest and greatly 
advances judicial efficiency: better ‘to secure the just, speedy[,] and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding,’ as Rule 1 demands.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 415 (2010). 
69. Sahyers II, 603 F.3d at 891 (Edmondson, J., concurring). 
70. Cf. id. at 894–95 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the court imposed a notice 
requirement contrary to the express language of the statute and failed to cite any rule to support its 
decision). 
71. Id. at 891 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
72. See id. (“District courts do not have the authority to sanction lawyers for conduct not 
proscribed by law or rule—which is the case here—without first providing them with notice that 
their conduct may warrant sanctions.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b))). 
73. Id. (citing In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995)). 
74. See id. (noting that “there is no dispute that the language of the statute is mandatory” 
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006))); see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“The court in such action 
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thus, was “contrary to settled . . . Supreme Court precedent providing that 
the use of a district court’s inherent supervisory powers is invalid when it 
conflicts with a statutory command.”75 
The other dissenter, Judge Charles Wilson, was even more pointed in 
his criticism.  Judge Wilson’s main concern was with what he considered 
to be the dangerous and insupportable precedent that the court’s opinion 
established—that “it is now within the inherent authority and discretion of 
the district courts in our Circuit to hold that no attorney’s fee is a 
reasonable fee when no pre-suit notice is extended to defendants who are 
lawyers.”76  Similar to Judge Barkett, Judge Wilson contended that the 
district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and costs was invalid because it 
conflicted with the FLSA’s mandate.77  The panel had, according to him, 
essentially read a pre-suit notice requirement into the terms of the FLSA, 
at least when an attorney or a law firm is the target of the action.78  
Though he acknowledged that “it is desirable to encourage lawyer 
collegiality and to discourage unnecessary litigation,” Judge Wilson 
deemed it inappropriate for the court to revise mandatory legislation to 
further these policy objectives.79 
More significantly, however, Judge Wilson expressed grave reservations 
about the out-of-the-blue manner in which the panel recognized the 
pre-suit notice duty.  Specifically, the panel “failed to cite any statute, rule, 
local rule, or case from [the Eleventh] Circuit, the Middle District of 
Florida, or elsewhere that even arguably imposes a duty on an attorney to 
contact prospective opposing counsel where that counsel represents a law 
firm or a lawyer.”80  He also correctly noted the absence of any rule of 
professional conduct that would alert counsel to the necessity of providing 
soon-to-be lawyer-defendants with the “courtesy of advance notice.”81  
 
shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s 
fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” (emphasis added)). 
75. Sahyers II, 603 F.3d at 891 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 250, 284 (1988); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985)); accord id. at 892 
(Wilson, J., dissenting) (“Although well-intentioned, I doubt that the federal courts have the inherent 
authority to ignore and override a statutory mandate in the interest of promoting a professional 
courtesy.”). 
76. Id. at 892.  Judge Wilson later stated that the “Sahyers opinion provides binding precedent 
for a district court to ignore a clear Congressional mandate from a federal statute based on its 
‘inherent powers.’”  Id. at 894. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. (citing Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 738 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
80. Id. at 894–95. 
81. Id. at 895. 
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The sole basis for recognition of this obligation was the court’s subjective 
assessment of what is required of attorneys as officers of the court, 
something that plaintiff’s counsel could not possibly have predicted. 
Even more troubling for Judge Wilson was the fact that this 
manufactured duty was given priority over plaintiff’s counsel’s duties to his 
client.  While he conceded that certain duties owed to the court by counsel 
properly take precedence over client-centered responsibilities, the pre-suit 
notice requirement in the context of this case was not one of them.82  
Moreover, under the circumstances presented, Judge Wilson concluded 
that there was nothing unlawful or unethical concerning plaintiff’s counsel 
being instructed by his client to just file suit.83  Consequently, he was 
actually ethically bound to do so.84  Given this, to subject plaintiff’s 
counsel to what amounted to a sanction for his failure to comport with a 
conflicting duty about which he had no prior notice—even in the interest 
of promoting civility, collegiality, and judicial efficiency—seems to have 
been unreasonable, at best.85 
While Judges Wilson’s and Barkett’s disapproval of and reservations 
about the panel’s decision are well-justified, the implications of Sahyers for 
litigators, in reality, may be more significant and potentially far-reaching 
than either of them contemplated.  Part III elaborates upon these 
conceivable consequences. 
III.     IMPLICATIONS OF AN OFFICER-OF-THE-COURT-BASED PRE-SUIT 
NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
 
Even if one accepts the proposition that Sahyers is limited to the narrow 
circumstances presented, serious concerns accompany the Eleventh 
 
82. See id. (noting that “while counsel owes a duty to the court, context matters”).  Judge 
Wilson also took issue with the court’s broad pronouncement that lawyers’ officer-of-the-court duties 
generally take priority over duties owed to clients.  Id. at 894; see In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 487–
88 (Del. 2007) (per curiam) (remarking that attorneys, as officers of the court, owe a greater duty to 
the court to act within ethical boundaries than to the client’s interests). 
83. Sahyers II, 603 F.3d at 895 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
84. See id (observing that “not only is there no rule requiring plaintiff’s counsel to give pre-suit 
notice to his fellow lawyers, plaintiff’s counsel had an ethical duty to follow his client’s instructions”); 
see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002) (requiring that attorneys abide by 
clients’ instructions “concerning the objectives of representation”). 
85. Judge Wilson closed his dissent by reiterating his misgivings about the precedent that the 
panel created, and observed that courts both within and outside of the Eleventh Circuit had begun to 
recognize “the proposition that no fee can be a reasonable fee under the FLSA when a plaintiff fails to 
give pre-suit notice to a lawyer-defendant.”  Sahyers II, 603 F.3d at 896 (Wilson, J., dissenting) 
(citing Roldan v. Pure Air Solutions, Inc., No. 07-22203-Civ, 2010 WL 410571, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 
Jan. 29, 2010)). 
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Circuit’s recognition of the pre-suit notice obligation.  At a minimum, the 
decision appears to open the door for district courts to exercise their 
inherent authority over officers of the court to deny attorney’s fees in 
FLSA lawsuits against lawyers when plaintiffs’ counsel fail to notify them 
of an impending action prior to filing.86  More broadly, however, the 
decision potentially empowers courts—in the ephemeral interest of 
“maintaining a bar that promotes civility and collegiality”87—to recognize 
heretofore unarticulated duties through the exercise of their inherent 
authority. 
Under Sahyers, it seems possible for district courts to punish whatever 
attorney behavior they subjectively consider to be inconsistent with proper 
litigation decorum because the panel’s reasoning is readily transferable to 
virtually any lawsuit.88  Convincing support for this contention flows 
directly from the two foundational pieces of the Sahyers courts’ pre-suit 
notice duty—(1) the promotion of civility and collegiality;89 and (2) the 
interest in judicial economy.90 
A. The Promotion of Civility and Collegiality Within the Bar 
The panel’s opinion in Sahyers placed substantial importance on the 
maintenance of “a bar that promotes civility and collegiality,” and noted 
that a federal court’s inherent power to control attorneys who practice 
before it includes this authority.91  As officers of the court, lawyers are 
beholden to this oversight and are bound to conform their behavior to 
procedural and ethical standards reasonably established by courts.92 
 
86. See id. (observing that “[i]t is now within the discretion of district courts in our [c]ircuit to 
deny attorney’s fees to lawyers who fail to extend professional courtesies to lawyer-defendants in 
FLSA and (presumably other) civil rights cases”). 
87. Id. at 891 (Edmondson, J., concurring). 
88. See id. at 894 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the opinion reads a requirement of 
pre-suit notice into the FLSA, at least where a lawyer or law firm is the defendant, thus giving itself 
the discretion to disregard the limits of the law it is charged with enforcing).  Given the narrow scope 
of the opinion, it admittedly may be more plausible that courts will limit their utilization of the 
Sahyers blueprint to recognition of pre-suit notice obligations, but its underlying reasoning clearly 
allows for potentially wider use.  See id. at 891 (Edmondson, J., concurring) (stating that one of the 
purposes of Sahyers was to promote collegiality in the judicial system). 
89. Id. 
90. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that the plaintiff’s lawyer’s 
actions caused the district court “to waste significant time and resources on unnecessary litigation”), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010). 
91. Id. at 1244 & n.5. 
92. See In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 487–88 (Del. 2007) (per curiam) (stating that a lawyer’s 
obligation to follow a court’s ethical requirements exceeds the duty to further a client’s interests); 
State ex rel. Foster v. City of Kansas City, 350 P.2d 37, 43–44 (Kan. 1960) (concluding that when 
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As a general matter, there is certainly nothing objectionable about such a 
framework.  Be that as it may, what qualifies as incivility will undoubtedly 
vary depending upon the circumstances involved and the presiding 
judge.93  Indeed, under the very facts of Sahyers, it would have been 
entirely plausible for a different court to have found nothing offensive 
about a lawyer obediently filing a lawsuit on behalf of a client who had a 
factually and legally supportable claim, as did the plaintiff in that case.94  
In Sahyers, however, plaintiff’s counsel’s blind adherence to his client’s 
instructions, combined with defendants’ status as attorneys, rendered the 
absence of notice peculiarly repugnant,95 and even led the panel to 
conclude that he had acted in bad faith.96 
In addition, Judge Edmondson enhanced the troubling likelihood that 
courts may reach disparate conclusions in assessing attorney deportment by 
tying the inherent authority to recognize and enforce civility-based 
officer-of-the-court duties to local customs and practices.97  More 
precisely, he observed for the panel that “[t]he customs of professional 
courtesy were important to the district court.”98  He further sharpened 
this characterization in his concurrence accompanying the denial of a 
rehearing en banc, maintaining that “[t]he District Judge specifically tied 
his decision to the local practices,”99 and acknowledging that “judges in 
other areas of [the Eleventh] Circuit may have different views based upon 
 
the state attorney general enters the court in his executive capacity, he becomes an officer of the court 
subject to the ethics code); see also Leimer v. Hulse, 178 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Mo. 1944) (stating that 
for a lawyer “[t]o properly do his part as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, his 
conduct must conform to a high standard of ethics”). 
93. See, e.g., Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to be Civil: Defining 
Civility As an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 141 (2011–12) (noting 
that “[i]n attempting a definition [of civility], one author went so far as to suggest that the best that 
can be said . . . is, like Justice Stewart’s assessment of pornography, that ‘you know it when you see 
it’” (footnote omitted) (citing Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don’t Work, 
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1988, at 79, 79)). 
94. See Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 895 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Wilson, J., dissenting) 
(observing that “plaintiff merely instructed her counsel to file a lawsuit, which—considering the fact 
that defendants filed an answer as opposed to a motion to dismiss and ultimately offered judgment—
appeared to have at least, some merit”). 
95. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1245 (observing that “[p]laintiff’s lawyer slavishly followed his 
client’s instructions and—without a word to [d]efendants in advance—just sued his fellow lawyers”).  
In a similar vein, the panel also observed that “[p]laintiff’s lawyer showed little concern for the district 
court’s time and energy and no courtesy to his fellow lawyers.”  Id. at 1245 n.7. 
96. Id. at 1246 n.9. 
97. See id. at 1245 n.8 (noting that the customs of professional conduct were influential to the 
district court’s judgment). 
98. Id. 
99. Sahyers II, 603 F.3d at 891 (Edmondson, J., concurring). 
BROWN_FINAL 6/26/2012  11:51 AM 
342 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 2:324 
different local circumstances.”100  Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit panel 
made matters worse by wedding these provincial notions of civility and 
collegiality to the equally pliable interest in judicial efficiency.101 
B. The Interest in Judicial Efficiency 
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supplies the guiding 
principle by which the succeeding rules are to be interpreted and applied—
“[t]hey should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”102  The 
latter statement embodies the concept of judicial efficiency, which is ever 
in the forefront of most federal judges’ minds, not just with regard to the 
administration of procedural rules, but also in connection with all other 
aspects of the litigation process.103  Indeed, in 1993, the words “and 
 
100. Id.  Interestingly, Judge Barkett, in her dissent, took issue with Judge Edmondson’s 
position regarding the significance of local attorney etiquette to recognition of the pre-suit notice 
obligation.  See id. (Barkett, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that the basis for the district court’s decision 
was on local customs).  Rather than basing its decision on local customs and practices, she contends 
that all the district court really did was express its view that it is “reasonable” to contact another 
lawyer before filing suit.  Id.  But see Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L., No. 8:07-cv-52-
T-30MAP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112849, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2008) (“Prior to filing suit in 
this local area, it is still reasonable to pick up the phone and call another lawyer so it won’t be 
necessary to file suit.”).  As noted, the focus of her dissent was on the inequity of imposing a pre-suit 
notice requirement on plaintiff’s counsel in the absence of any prior warning, and her assessment of 
the manner in which the trial judge reached his decision strengthens her position.  See Sahyers II, 603 
F.3d at 891–92 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (opining that because the district court’s decision was not 
based on any law, rule, or local custom, plaintiff’s attorney should have been afforded notice before 
the sanction).  In other words, the fact that the judge did not base his recognition of the duty on the 
existence of an identifiable local custom renders his determination all the more unpredictable.  Judge 
Wilson, in his dissent, failed to even acknowledge the ostensible “local custom” aspect of the trial 
court’s decision.  For him, the absence of an articulated statute or rule that created the pre-suit notice 
obligation was the real problem.  See id. at 895–96 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the district 
court’s decision was not based on any existing rule and its reliance upon a Second Circuit case was 
misplaced (citing Litton Sys., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983))). 
101. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1245 (ruling that the district court was correct in deciding that 
the “conscious disregard for lawyer-to-lawyer collegiality and civility caused (among other things) the 
judiciary to waste significant time and resources on unnecessary litigation and stood in stark contrast 
to the behavior expected of an officer of the court”). 
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
103. See Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 301–02 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming 
district court’s discretion to order a more definite statement of pleadings “to avoid a waste of judicial 
resources”); Gulf Grp. Holdings, Inc. v. Coast Asset Mgmt. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1265 
(S.D. Fla. 2007) (“Procedural rules are designed to assist in case management and to prevent 
prejudice to litigants, not to provide avenues for a litigant to escape liability on the basis of opposing 
counsel’s technical misstep.”); Berube v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., No. 3:06cv197 (PCD), 2006 
WL 3826702, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 30, 2006) (emphasizing the need to adhere to discovery 
deadlines because to do otherwise would embrace a “chaotic system” making it “impossible for cases 
to be resolved in a ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ manner contemplated by Rule 1” (quoting Billups 
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administered” were added to the rule for the express purpose of 
emphasizing the “affirmative duty of the court to exercise the authority 
conferred by [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] to ensure that civil 
litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost or 
delay.”104 
In Sahyers, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the importance of inherent 
authority to federal courts’ strong interest in procedural efficiency and 
proclaimed that adherence to the ideals of civility and collegiality within 
the profession meaningfully advances that objective.105  In other words, 
by working together in a courteous and cooperative fashion, lawyers 
enhance the likelihood that justice will be obtained inexpensively and 
expeditiously.106  Had Sahyers’s counsel acted with the requisite 
professional courtesy by providing the defendants with pre-suit notice of 
Sahyers’s claim, the court suggests that the dispute would have been 
resolved without resort to litigation, thereby avoiding the unnecessary 
expenditure of time and effort by the trial court.107 
Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit linked the systemic obligation to 
assist in the maintenance of an efficient judicial process to Sahyers’s 
counsel’s status as an officer of the court.108  While that phrase is 
admittedly somewhat confusing and subject to varying interpretations,109 
 
v. West, No. 95 Civ. 1146 (KMW)(HBP), 1997 WL 100798, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1997))); 
Enright v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1072 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (invoking authority 
under Rule 1 and other judicial economy-related rules to impose a thirty-hour limitation for trial “to 
ensure the interests of justice and to most effectively utilize the court’s resources”); Jackson v. Cnty. 
of Sacramento, 175 F.R.D. 653, 658 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (limiting discovery to avoid undue expense in 
accordance with Rule 1 (citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979))). 
104. FED. R. CIV. P.  1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (emphasis added). 
105. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1244–45. 
106. See id. at 1244 n.5 (declaring that “maintaining a bar that promotes civility and 
collegiality is in the public interest and greatly advances judicial efficiency”). 
107. See id. at 1245 (contending that plaintiff’s uncivil behavior “caused . . . the judiciary to 
waste significant time and resources on unnecessary litigation”). 
108. See id. (stating that the waste of judicial resources by uncivil behavior “stood in stark 
contrast to the behavior expected of an officer of the court”). 
109. See infra Part V.B (discussing various perspectives on the meaning of officer of the court); 
see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 77 (1989) 
(observing that the conflict between a lawyer’s role as an officer of the court and the more definitive 
zealous advocacy duty “creates confusion and cynicism within the bar” (citing Heinz & Laumann, 
The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 
1111, 1140 (1978); E. Wayne Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to Report Other Lawyers’ 
Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95, 100)); George A. Riemer, 
Officers of the Court: What Does it Mean?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug.-Sept. 2001, at 27, 27 (contending 
that the officer of the court label “is very ambiguous in meaning and gets in the way of understanding 
the source and scope of the ethical duties of lawyers” (citing 37 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 1251 (1976))).  
See generally James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of the 
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it is frequently associated with a lawyer’s perceived role as an actual agent 
of the court in regard to the administration of justice.110  Utilizing this 
conception of the standard, the Eleventh Circuit deemed it incumbent 
upon Sahyers’s attorney to act essentially as a judicial gatekeeper, 
protecting the legal system from needless expense and effort.111 
It is undeniable that the officer-of-the-court and judicial efficiency 
components of Sahyers’s pre-suit notice duty cannot be restricted solely to 
the facts and circumstances presented.  Lawyers are officers of the court no 
matter what the litigation context,112 and presumably their related 
responsibility to safeguard the process goes hand-in-hand with that legal 
station.  Hence, it was, at best, naïve for the Eleventh Circuit to aver that 
its decision did not establish precedent for recognition of pre-suit notice 
 
Court”, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 387–408 (2000) (providing a thoughtful critique of the confusion 
caused by the officer-of-the-court title with regard to a lawyer’s proper role). 
110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (observing that “as 
officers of the court, attorneys share [the court’s] responsibility” to ensure the fair and efficient 
resolution of civil litigation); see also Minority Police Officers Ass’n of S. Bend v. City of S. Bend, 
Ind., 721 F.2d 197, 199 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be 
created through consent of the parties, federal courts “have an independent obligation to police the 
constitutional and statutory limitations on [their] jurisdiction, and . . . counsel, as officers of the 
court, have a professional obligation to assist . . . in this task”); Consumer Crusade, Inc. v. Pub. Tel. 
Corp. of Am., No. 05-cv-00208-MSK-CBS, 2006 WL 2434081, at *7 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2006) 
(maintaining that while “[e]very party has the right to zealously pursue all legal relief to which they 
may be entitled, . . . counsel have a concomitant obligation as officers of the court and stewards of the 
process to discourage the pursuit of . . . frivolous, inconsequential, or ineffective remedies”); People ex 
rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that a lawyer, once admitted to the bar, 
becomes an officer of the court); Langen v. Borkowski, 206 N.W. 181, 190 (Wis. 1925) (remarking 
that a lawyer “occupies what may be termed a quasi[-]judicial office”); infra Part V.B (discussing how 
courts use the officer-of-the-court label to emphasize the “higher calling” aspect of a lawyer’s role). 
111. Other courts have embraced similar conceptions of what is required of their legal 
“officers.”  See Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 743, 750 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“As 
officers of the court, attorneys have obligations not just to their clients, but also to the court, their 
opponents, and society at large, to refrain not only from filing meritless lawsuits, but to refrain from 
prosecuting them once it becomes clear that they are without merit.”); infra Part V.B (arguing that 
courts sometimes adopt a “gatekeeper” view of a lawyer’s officer-of-the-court duties as seen in Cicero); 
cf. Chi. Title & Trust Co. v. Verona Sports Inc., 11 F.3d 678, 679 (7th Cir. 1993) (observing in the 
appellate context that “[c]ounsel, as an officer of the court, has a special responsibility to avoid 
needless expenditure of judicial resources by addressing the issue of settlement, when appropriate, at a 
point in the preparation of the appeal that does not place needless strain upon the court”). 
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (discussing that 
attorneys, acting as officers of the court, are entrusted with responsibility to promote the fair and 
efficient resolution in civil litigation); Culkin, 162 N.E. at 489 (stating that a lawyer becomes an 
officer of the court following admission to the bar); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of 
the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 48 (1989) (explaining that as officers of the court, lawyers must 
assume a quasi-judicial role which may force the subordination of client interests to serve the interests 
of the public and judicial system). 
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obligations in other settings.113 
As further support for this proposition, it is instructive to examine the 
purpose underlying the widely-adopted pre-suit notice requirement in 
medical malpractice cases.  Part IV demonstrates that the basis for 
mandating pre-filing notification in such cases mirrors the Eleventh 
Circuit’s principal rationale in Sahyers. 
IV.     PRE-SUIT NOTICE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS 
 
A common requirement in medical malpractice cases is that plaintiffs 
formally notify defendants of their intent to sue prior to instituting an 
action.  In Texas, for example, Section 74.051(a) of the Civil Practices and 
Remedies Code provides that:  
Any person or his authorized agent asserting a health care liability claim shall 
give written notice of such claim by certified mail, return receipt requested, 
to each physician or health care provider against whom such claim is being 
made at least 60 days before the filing of a suit in any court of this state 
based upon a health care liability claim.114  
Florida has a similar provision that imposes a ninety-day waiting period 
following the mailing of the required notice115 and mandates, as a 
prerequisite, pre-suit investigation.116 
There are two related purposes for such provisions, both of which center 
around a concern for judicial efficiency.  The first is to promote settlement 
 
113. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1246 (stating that Sahyers did not establish precedent and is 
limited to its facts). 
114. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.051(a) (West 2011). 
115. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106(3)(a) (West Supp. 2012) (“No suit may be filed for a 
period of 90 days after notice is mailed to any prospective defendant.”). 
116. See id. § 766.106(2)(a) (“After completion of pre[-]suit investigation pursuant to 
§ 766.203(2) and prior to filing a complaint for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each 
prospective defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for 
medical negligence.”); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364(a) (Deering 2005) (“No action based 
upon the health care provider’s professional negligence may be commenced unless the defendant has 
been given at least 90 days’ prior notice of the intention to commence the action.”); D.C. CODE 
§ 16-2802(a) (LexisNexis 2001) (“Any person who intends to file an action in the court alleging 
medical malpractice against a healthcare provider shall notify the intended defendant of his or her 
action not less than 90 days prior to filing the action.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2912b(1) 
(LexisNexis 2004) (“[A] person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a 
health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health 
facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.”); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-412(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (“A malpractice action against a health care 
provider may not be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his 
executor or successor, at least 90 days’ prior notice of intent to commence an action.”). 
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without the necessity of an actual lawsuit.117  Specifically, pre-suit notice 
is believed to open the line of communication between opposing counsel 
before the respective parties expend substantial time and money on the 
dispute and almost invariably become entrenched in their adversarial 
positions.118 
The second function served by the medical malpractice notice obligation 
is to weed out frivolous claims.  Though this purpose is more closely tied 
to the merits-related certification requirements that typically accompany 
such provisions,119 notice itself also undeniably plays a role here.  In 
particular, it forces plaintiffs to reflect upon and perhaps reconsider their 
contentions before proceeding and gives defendants the chance to respond, 
possibly in a fashion that alerts plaintiffs to the potentially meritless nature 
of their proposed actions.120 
It is interesting to note that encouraging settlement and deterring 
frivolous litigation are the only rationales offered for pre-suit notice in the 
 
117. See Rabatin v. Kidd, 281 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.) (observing 
that “[t]he [l]egislature’s purpose in requiring notice in a medical liability suit is to encourage pre-suit 
negotiations, settlement, and reduce litigation costs” (citing Hill v. Russell, 247 S.W.3d 356, 360 
(Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.))); see also Largie v. Gregorian, 913 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2005) (proclaiming that Florida’s medical malpractice pre-suit procedures “establish[] a process 
intended to promote the settlement of meritorious claims at an early stage without the necessity of a 
full adversarial proceeding” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
118. See, e.g., Rhoades v. Sw. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 554 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1990) (observing that the medical malpractice pre-suit notification and investigation provisions 
“evidence a clear legislative intent to discourage costly and time-consuming medical malpractice 
litigation, to promote the culling of meritless claims, and to encourage settlement of meritorious 
claims”). 
119. Most medical malpractice pre-suit notice provisions also require that plaintiffs certify, in 
some manner, the validity of their claims, usually by way of an expert affidavit or other formal 
verification.  See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-8-4 (LexisNexis 2008) (“[A]n action against a health care 
provider may not be commenced in a court in Indiana before: (1) the claimant’s proposed complaint 
has been presented to a medical review panel established under IC 34-18-10 . . . and (2) an opinion is 
given by the panel.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-15(A) (LexisNexis 2004) (“No malpractice action 
may be filed in any court against a qualifying health care provider before application is made to the 
medical review commission and its decision is rendered.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125(A) (Supp. 
2011) (requiring pre-filing notice, as well as an affidavit of an expert witness). 
120. See Slaughter v. United States, No. 5:08-1016, 2010 WL 1380009, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. 
Feb. 3, 2010) (restating the West Virginia Supreme Court’s position that “the purposes of requiring a 
pre-suit notice of claim and screening certificate of merit are (1) to prevent the making and filing of 
frivolous medical malpractice claims and lawsuits; and (2) to promote the pre-suit resolution of non-
frivolous medical malpractice claims” (quoting Hichman v. Gillette, 618 S.E.2d 387, 394 (W. Va. 
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Univ. of Miami v. Wilson, 948 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“The policy underlying the medical malpractice statutory scheme is to require 
the parties to engage in meaningful pre[-]suit investigation, discovery, and negotiations, thereby 
screening out frivolous lawsuits and defenses and encouraging the early determination and prompt 
resolution of claims.” (citing Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278, 284 (Fla. 1996))). 
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medical malpractice context.  Unlike the Sahyers notice requirement,121 
there is no mention of any desire to promote civility or collegiality within 
the bar, nor is the obligation characterized as emanating from a lawyer’s 
role as an officer of the court.  The most telling distinction, however, is the 
bright-line statutory codification of the notice duty for malpractice cases. 
By affording lawyers advance warning of their responsibility to notify 
the opposition prior to filing an action, legislatures have eased the potential 
tension that could exist between plaintiffs’ counsel endeavoring to fulfill 
their duties as loyal, zealous client advocates while simultaneously living up 
to their obligations as officers of the court.  In other words, counsel has no 
choice regarding whether to apprise a prospective adversary of an 
impending action.122  If a plaintiff, as in Sahyers, demands that his or her 
attorney file suit immediately without first contacting the defendants or 
their counsel, the attorney would be legally unable to follow those 
instructions.  In fact, not only would it be improper to do so, it would 
also, at a minimum, result in potentially prejudicial delay of the plaintiff’s 
action,123 a fact that competent counsel would undoubtedly explain to a 
recalcitrant client.124 
The medical malpractice example plainly demonstrates that there is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with a pre-suit notice duty.  In fact, it seems 
like an eminently reasonable requirement with various salutary benefits, 
the most significant of which is enhanced judicial efficiency.125  
Furthermore, even though the officer-of-the-court tag is not overtly 
utilized as a justification for the obligation by legislatures, it is clear that 
 
121. Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1245–46 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010). 
122. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364(a) (Deering 2005) (requiring notice before a medical 
malpractice suit can be initiated); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106(3)(a) (West Supp. 2012) (same); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2912b(1) (LexisNexis 2004) (same); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 74.051(a) (West 2011) (same). 
123. See Hooper v. Sanford, 968 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1997, no pet.) 
(observing that “[i]t is well-settled law in Texas that a plaintiff’s failure to give sixty days notice to 
defendants should result in abatement”). 
124. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2002) (providing that “[a] lawyer 
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation”). 
125. See Slaughter, 2010 WL 1380009, at *7 (emphasizing that pre-suit notice in medical 
malpractice is designed to discourage frivolous claims and lawsuits as well as to encourage the 
resolution prima facie malpractice claims before suit); Wilson, 948 So. 2d at 777 (explaining that the 
medical malpractice statutes are intended to influence counsel to engage in pre-suit discovery, thereby 
identifying frivolous claims and leading to the expeditious resolution of disputes); Rabatin v Kidd, 
281 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.) (discussing that the notice requirement in 
medical practice cases is intended to promote pre-suit negotiations and settlements out of court). 
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this concept is likely lurking somewhere in the background.126  As a 
result, notwithstanding its analytical flaws, the basis for Sahyers’s holding 
appears sound at its core.  Lawyers, as officers of the court, owe it to the 
judiciary, the profession, and the public to treat one another in a civil and 
respectful manner, which will reliably lead to enhanced judicial 
efficiency.127  That is the central message of Sahyers, and one would be 
hard-pressed to rationally disagree with its logic. 
The problem, however, stems from the ex post, ad hoc approach 
employed by the court.  Sahyers’s result would have been more palatable if, 
as in the medical malpractice setting, plaintiff’s counsel had advance 
awareness of the pre-suit notice duty.  He then could have explained to his 
client why it was not appropriate to file suit without first contacting the 
defendants.  Generally, such a bright-line rule would simplify the lawyer’s 
world and enable him or her to readily reconcile this particular 
officer-of-the-court duty with obligations owed to the client.128  While 
uncomplicating the potential ethical dilemma for counsel in this fashion 
would be helpful, it could detract from the principal objective of 
promoting civility and collegiality more broadly in the public interest. 
As a result, it is important to examine more deeply the potential effects 
of courts’ utilization of looming, unarticulated officer-of-the-court 
responsibilities to achieve enhanced civility and collegiality.  After 
elaborating upon the evolution and meaning of the officer-of-the-court 
label, Part V analyzes these effects. 
 
126. Medical malpractice statutory objectives (i.e., preventing costly litigation and encouraging 
settlement) are similar to the goals espoused in Sahyers for the officer-of-the-court duties recognized.  
Compare Rhoades v. Sw. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 554 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) 
(same), and Rabatin, 281 S.W.3d at 562 (listing avoiding costly litigation and encouraging settlement 
as two goals of medical malpractice statutes), with Sahyers I, 560 F.3d at 1245 (remarking that it is 
the duty of an officer of the court to avoid causing “the judiciary to waste significant time and 
resources on unnecessary litigation”). 
127. See Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 742, 750 (E.D. Mich. 2001) 
(stating that lawyers, under the officer-of-the-court label, have duties to their clients, opponents, and 
society to refrain from pursuing meritless lawsuits as well as refrain from continuing to pursue 
lawsuits upon the realization that they lack merit); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of 
the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 43 (1989) (explaining that the officer-of–the-court label suggests 
“lawyers owe a special duty to the judicial system or, perhaps, to the public that other participants in 
the legal process do not owe”). 
128. Cf. George A. Riemer, Officers of the Court: What Does it Mean?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug.-
Sept. 2001, at 27, 27 (observing that the officer-of-the-court requirement is perplexing as a result of 
its ambiguity and often interferes with a lawyer’s understanding of his or her ethical duties). 
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V.     OFFICER-OF-THE-COURT STATUS AS A VEHICLE FOR PROMOTING 
CIVILITY AND COLLEGIALITY 
A. “Officer of the Court” Defined 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines an officer of the court as one “who is 
charged with upholding the law and administering the judicial system.”129  
While this description can be interpreted to encompass lawyers, Black’s 
explains that the title is normally used in reference to judges, clerks, 
sheriffs, and other individuals commonly thought of as court officials in a 
strict governmental sense.130  Nevertheless, the dictionary definition 
acknowledges that the officer-of-the-court label also applies to lawyers, 
albeit in a more limited fashion.131  In particular, it suggests that two 
components of a lawyer’s role justify “officer of the court” status: (1) the 
obligation to obey court rules; and (2) the duty of candor owed to the 
court.132 
This definitional circumscription seems eminently logical in light of the 
more accepted usage of the officer-of-the-court designation.  Specifically, 
for the judicial system to operate properly, the participants must fulfill 
certain roles.  Judges, clerks, bailiffs, and sheriffs all have official 
responsibilities that facilitate the adjudicative process.133  Although 
attorneys are typically private employees who represent nongovernmental 
interests, they are, nonetheless, integral pieces of the juridical puzzle.134  
As such, they must act not only to champion the private interests that they 
serve but also to assist in the fair and efficient administration of the 
process.135  The lawyerly duties that attach to this latter facet of the 
 
129. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009). 
130. Id.; accord In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 728 (1973) (noting that attorneys’ status as 
officers of the court does not place them in the “same category as marshals, bailiffs, court clerks[,] or 
judges”). 
131. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009). 
132. Id. 
133. See Petition of Mone, 719 A.2d 626, 633 (N.H. 1998) (describing the role of bailiffs as 
guarding juries and relaying messages to the judge); Langen v. Borkowski, 206 N.W. 181, 190 (Wis. 
1925) (explaining “[t]he duties of the clerk of the court[]”). 
134. See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 668 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (describing a 
lawyer as “an intimate and trusted and essential part of the machinery of justice, an ‘officer of the 
court’ in the most compelling sense”). 
135. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The purpose of 
this revision . . . is to recognize the affirmative duty of the court to exercise the authority conferred by 
these rules to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost or 
delay.  As officers of the court, attorneys share this responsibility with the judge to whom the case is 
assigned.”); see also Minority Police Officers Ass’n of S. Bend v. City of S. Bend, Ind., 721 F.2d 197, 
199 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that attorneys also have an obligation to assist the court in policing 
its jurisdiction); Consumer Crusade, Inc. v. Pub. Tel. Corp. of Am., No. 05-cv-00208-MSK-CBS, 
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attorney’s role are delineated in Black’s—adherence to rules that govern 
judicial proceedings and the all-important obligation to be forthright and 
honest with the court.136 
The Black’s definition, in effect, restricts attorneys’ officer-of-the-court 
duties by linking them directly to readily cognizable legal standards.  For 
example, if a lawyer disobeys a concrete rule of procedure or fails to 
disclose to the court controlling contrary authority not cited by the 
opposition,137 under the Black’s formulation, the lawyer has contravened 
his or her role as an officer of the court and should rightly be subject to 
appropriate consequences.138  In the author’s opinion, this approach 
embodies the better view in terms of defining the scope of a lawyer’s 
officer-of-the-court responsibilities.  Unfortunately, it is not representative 
of the philosophy that courts have traditionally embraced.  Indeed, there is 
no single, clear definition for officer of the court as it pertains to lawyers, a 
fact that has historically created confusion.139 
 
2006 WL 2434081, at *7 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2006) (stating that an attorney, “as an officer of the 
court,” is obligated to not create unnecessary delay in litigation); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 
N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (emphasizing the fact that attorneys, as officers of the court, are required 
to “advance the ends of justice”); Langen, 206 N.W. at 190 (“An attorney at law is an officer of the 
court.  The nature of his obligations is both public and private.  His public duty consists in his 
obligation to aid the administration of justice; his private duty, to faithfully, honestly, and 
conscientiously represent the interests of his client.”). 
136. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009) (explaining that the term “officer of 
the court . . . applies to a lawyer, who is obliged to obey court rules and who owes a duty of candor to 
the court”). 
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2002) (“A lawyer shall not 
knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to 
the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing 
counsel . . . .”). 
138. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009) (stating that as officers of the court, 
lawyers must obey court rules). 
139. See Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 n.3 (1956) (citing to various cases that 
illustrate “confusion and difficulty of courts in explaining what is meant when a lawyer is called an 
officer of the court” (citations omitted)); supra Part III.B (noting that the officer-of-the-court label is 
confusing and subject to varying interpretations); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the 
Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 77 (1989) (observing that the conflict between a lawyer’s role as an 
officer of the court and the more definitive zealous advocacy duty “creates confusion and cynicism 
within the bar” (citing Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional Roles, and 
Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1111, 1140 (1978); E. Wayne Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and 
Judges to Report Other Lawyers’ Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 
95, 100))); George A. Riemer, Officers of the Court: What Does it Mean?, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug.-
Sept. 2001, at 27, 27 (contending that the officer-of-the-court label “is very ambiguous in meaning 
and gets in the way of understanding the source and scope of the ethical duties of lawyers”). 
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B. Varying Perspectives on the Meaning of Officer of the Court 
Although the genesis of officers of the court as a title for lawyers is not 
entirely clear,140 its pedigree can be traced to England.141  Specifically, 
English courts used to require that litigants “appear in court in company 
with an official court retainer”142—they literally had to retain a “court 
official” in addition to their privately retained solicitor.143  It should also 
be noted that the first licensed legal professionals in England were actually 
“officers of the Crown and, therefore, of its court as well,”144 and were 
apparently referred to as “[s]ervants at law of our lord, the King.”145 
Notwithstanding this technical, common law ancestry, officer of the 
court has never really been employed quite so literally in reference to 
private attorneys in America.146  Rather, the phrase was originally used “to 
signal the close working relationship between courts and the lawyers 
appearing before them, and also that courts are the front-line regulators of 
lawyer conduct.”147  While this initial formulation seems somewhat akin 
to the stance proffered in Black’s,148 over time, the American usage took 
 
140. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 42 (1989) 
(observing that “the origin of the characterization is murky”) (citation omitted); see also CHARLES W. 
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 1.6 (1986) (noting that the “origins of the ‘officer[-]of[-
]the[-]court’ title are obscure”). 
141. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 732 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The role of a 
lawyer as an officer of the court predates the Constitution; it was carried over from the English 
system and became firmly embedded in our tradition.”); Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 
1536, 1546 (11th Cir. 1993) (observing that the “concept is as old as the common law jurisprudence 
itself”); RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LAWYERS, COURTS, AND PROFESSIONALISM: THE AGENDA FOR 
REFORM 120 (1989) (noting that “[t]he term ‘officer of the court’ was once an integral part of the 
English system when lawyers were directly amenable to the king as parts of the royal judicial 
system”); 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.8 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) 
(maintaining that American courts borrowed the notion of lawyers as officers of the court from the 
English); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 42 (1989) 
(stating that many commentators have contended that “officer of the court” has its origins in 
England, where nonparty participants in the legal system were the Crown’s officers and, therefore, 
also officers of the court (citing GEORGE WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 29–31 (2d ed. 
1920))). 
142. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 1.6 (1986). 
143. Id. 
144. Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 42 (1989). 
145. Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1546 (quoting GEORGE WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 30 
(1902)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
146. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.8 (3d ed. Supp. 
2011) (observing that “[a]lthough there is some evidence that at common law this literally meant that 
lawyers were considered to be judicial officers, and thus members of the court, that was never the 
American tradition”). 
147. Id. 
148. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009) (defining officer of the court as one 
“who is charged with upholding the law and administering the judicial system”); supra Part V.A 
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on a decidedly less definite and more pretentious air149 in an apparent 
effort to distinguish “true” lawyer professionals from those of the so-called 
“hired-gun” variety.150 
Courts frequently carted out the label to emphasize the higher-calling 
aspect of a lawyer’s role.  For instance, in his oft-cited description of the 
expectations that flow from membership in the legal profession, Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo151 loftily sermonized about a lawyer’s rarified standing 
as an officer of the court: “Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened 
with conditions.  [A lawyer is] received into that ancient fellowship for 
something more than private gain.  He [becomes] an officer of the court, 
and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of 
justice.”152  The Wisconsin Supreme Court espoused a similarly laudatory 
equation of officer-of-the-court status with a judge’s role in Langen v. 
Borkowski.153  There, after acknowledging both the public and private 
aspects of a lawyer’s responsibilities, the court appeared to go even farther 
than Justice Cardozo in linking the duties of judge and attorney:  
In every case that comes to him in his professional capacity, he must 
determine wherein lies his obligations of the public and his obligations to his 
client, and to discharge this duty properly requires the exercise of a keen 
discrimination, and wherever the duties to his client conflict with those he 
owes to the public as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, 
the former must yield to the latter.  He therefore occupies what may be 
 
(discussing the Black’s definition). 
149. See James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of the 
Court,” 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 349 (2000) (maintaining that the officer-of-the-court phrase “has 
surprisingly little content [and] is mostly rhetoric, caused by self-love and self-promotion”); Eugene 
R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 39 (1989) (describing the 
officer-of-the-court characterization as “vacuous and unduly self-laudatory”). 
150. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.8 (3d ed. Supp. 
2011); accord In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 732 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (contending that 
“[w]hatever the erosion of the officer-of-the-court role, the overwhelming proportion of the legal 
profession rejects both the denigrated role of the advocate and counselor that renders him a lackey to 
the client and the alien idea that he is an agent of government” (citing AM. BAR ASS’N, PROJECT ON 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 1.1 (Approved Draft 1971))). 
151. At the time, Justice Cardozo was the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. 
152. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added); see also GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 58 (1869) 
(maintaining in regard to a lawyer’s oath that “[i]t is an oath of office, and the practitioner, the 
incumbent of an office—an office in the administration of justice—held by authority from those who 
represent in her tribunals the majesty of the commonwealth, a majesty truly more august than that of 
kings or emperors” (footnote omitted)). 
153. Langen v. Borkowski, 206 N.W. 181 (Wis. 1925). 
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termed a quasi judicial office.154  
The practice of sanctifying the role of legal professionals was further 
heightened during the 1970s and 1980s as a response to the organized 
bar’s concern over a perceived escalation in lawyer zeal and decline in 
civility and collegiality among its members.  The principal critic of this 
changing paradigm was Chief Justice Warren Burger,155 who led the 
charge for rekindling what he believed to be a lost sense of professionalism 
in the bar.156  As a matter of fact, he was the primary inspiration for the 
creation of the American Bar Association’s Commission on 
Professionalism,157 which issued a report in 1986 titled “. . . In the Spirit 
of Public Service:” A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer 
Professionalism.158 
In keeping with his grand view of the profession, Chief Justice Burger, 
in a dissenting opinion in In re Griffiths,159 placed lawyers on virtually the 
same plane as judges in describing their role as officers of the court.  In 
particular, he observed that even though attorneys’ specific duties are 
 
154. Id. at 190; accord Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 
39, 43, 48 (1989) (observing that the officer-of-the-court “characterization inherently suggests that 
lawyers owe a special duty to the judicial system or, perhaps, to the public that other participants in 
the legal process do not owe” and contending that the officer-of-the-court label “suggest[s] that 
lawyers sometimes must act in a quasi-judicial or quasi-official capacity despite duties owed to their 
clients”). 
155. See John Stuart Smith, Civility in the Courtroom from a Litigator's Perspective, N.Y. ST. 
B.J., May/June 1997, at 28, 28 (“Many trace the self-critical effort of the organized bar to determine 
standards for appropriate professional conduct to the alarm sounded by former Chief Justice Warren 
Burger in the early seventies.”); see also William C. McMahon III, Recent Development, Declining 
Professionalism in Court: A Comparative Look at the English Barrister, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845, 
857 (2006) (explaining that Chief Justice Burger praised the integrity of barristers in England and 
advocated for the establishment of a similar system in America (citing Hugh Maddox, An Old 
Tradition with a New Mission: The American Inns of Court, 54 ALA. LAW. 381, 381 (1993))). 
156. See John Stuart Smith, Civility in the Courtroom from a Litigator’s Perspective, N.Y. ST. 
B.J., May–June 1997, at 28, 28 (“One of Justice Burger’s articles paid particular attention to what he 
viewed as the deterioration in the level of civility displayed by lawyers in their dealings with each 
other and with courts.” (citing Warren Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211, 213 
(1971))). 
157. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 19 (2010) (noting that 
“[m]uch of the current focus on law as a ‘professional’ function is a legacy of the A.B.A. Commission 
on Professionalism, created at the urging of Chief Justice Warren Burger in the mid-1980s”). 
158. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC 
SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986).  
Interestingly, the report, among other things, stressed the need for the bar to place “far greater 
emphasis . . . on the role of the lawyer as both an officer of the court and, more broadly, as an officer 
of the system of justice.”  Id. at 28.  The Commission, however, did little to explain the composition 
of these official roles, leaving it to others to provide such substance. 
159. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
BROWN_FINAL 6/26/2012  11:51 AM 
354 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 2:324 
different, as officers of the court, they are “part of the official mechanism 
of justice in the sense of other court officers, including the judge.”160  
Chief Justice Burger further noted the critical importance of lawyers’ 
independence from both the government and their individual clients, and 
he emphasized how this sets the legal profession apart from other 
occupations—attorneys are called upon, as officers of the court, to exercise 
independent professional judgment as to which obligations of duty and 
conscience play significant roles.161 
Subsequently, in In re Snyder,162 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a 
unanimous Court, again expressed a characteristically elevated opinion of a 
lawyer’s role as an officer of the court, but this time he described that 
status in more concrete, functional terms.  This case involved attorney 
Snyder’s challenging of a six-month suspension imposed by the Eighth 
Circuit, stemming from a harsh letter that he sent to a district court 
judge’s secretary criticizing the manner in which the circuit administered 
the Criminal Justice Act.163  Specifically, Snyder had accepted an 
appointment to represent an indigent criminal defendant and encountered 
frustrating difficulties in his efforts to recover his related attorney’s fees and 
expenses.164  As a result of the disrespectful tone of this letter, the Eighth 
 
160. Id. at 731 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  In Griffiths, the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional a Connecticut state court rule that required bar applicants to be citizens of the 
United States.  Id. at 729 (majority opinion).  The appellant was a resident alien, rather than a U.S. 
citizen, and on that basis alone, she was not permitted to sit for the Connecticut bar exam.  Id. at 
718. 
161. See id. at 732 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (observing that “[t]he very independence of the 
lawyer from the government on the one hand and client on the other is what makes law a profession, 
something apart from trades and vocations in which obligations of duty and conscience play a lesser 
part”); see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 44–45 
(1989) (noting that “[b]y asserting that their profession is somehow imbued with a public or judicial 
element, lawyers distinguish themselves favorably from other occupational groups that serve their 
own clientele as paid agents, concerned only with their principals’ narrow private interests” (footnote 
omitted)). 
162. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985). 
163. Id. at 636–37. 
164. See id. (describing the lawyer’s difficulty in receiving attorney’s fees due to insufficient 
documentation and computer issues).  In pertinent part, the attorney’s letter provided as follows:  
[N]ot only are we paid an amount of money which does not even cover our overhead, but we 
have to go through extreme gymnastics even to receive the puny amounts which the federal 
courts authorize for this work.  We have sent you everything we have concerning our 
representation, and I am not sending you anything else.  You can take it or leave it. 
 Further, I am extremely disgusted by the treatment of us by the Eighth Circuit in this case, 
and you are instructed to remove my name from the list of attorneys who will accept criminal 
indigent defense work.  I have simply had it.  
Id. at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Circuit ultimately found that Snyder violated Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 46 by engaging in “conduct unbecoming a member of the 
bar,”165 and thus suspended him from practicing before the circuit for six 
months.166 
In determining whether the Eighth Circuit acted properly, Chief Justice 
Burger observed that when assessing whether an attorney has acted in a 
manner unbecoming a member of the bar, the court should acknowledge 
the “complex code of behavior” and dual obligations to the court and 
client that an attorney is required to follow.167  He then proceeded to 
elaborate on a lawyer’s role as an officer of the court:  
  As an officer of the court, a member of the bar enjoys singular powers 
that others do not possess; by virtue of admission, members of the bar share 
a kind of monopoly granted only to lawyers.  Admission creates a license not 
only to advise and counsel clients but to appear in court and try cases; as an 
officer of the court, a lawyer can cause persons to drop their private affairs 
and be called as witnesses in court, and for depositions and other pretrial 
processes that, while subject to the ultimate control of the court, may be 
conducted outside courtrooms.  The license granted by the court requires 
members of the bar to conduct themselves in a manner compatible with the 
role of courts in the administration of justice.168  
Chief Justice Burger concluded, somewhat unhelpfully, that “conduct 
unbecoming a member of the bar” is behavior inconsistent with 
professional standards that demonstrates “an unfitness to discharge 
continuing obligations to clients or the courts, or conduct inimical to the 
administration of justice.”169  According to him, the substance for making 
a determination as to a violation of this norm had to be ascertained from 
other sources, namely, case law, court rules, and the “‘lore of the 
profession,’ as embodied in codes of professional conduct.”170 
While this functional approach to defining officer-of-the-court duties 
seems like an improvement, it ultimately fails to inform lawyers of the 
circumstances under which they would be deemed to have breached these 
responsibilities.  In fact, in concluding that Snyder did not engage in 
“conduct unbecoming a member of the bar,” the Court confusingly 
emphasized the necessity for civility by attorneys within the judicial 
 
165. FED. R. APP. P. 46(c). 
166. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 640. 
167. Id. at 644 (quoting In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 324 (1st Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
168. Id. at 644–45. 
169. Id. at 645. 
170. Id. 
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process—a standard to which Snyder admittedly failed to adhere.171  The 
Court basically found that his conduct, while perhaps unlawyerly and 
rude, was not sufficiently egregious by itself to warrant the suspension.172  
The question begged, of course, is: What would be sufficient? 
In more contemporary cases, many courts seem to have reverted back to 
the esoteric, exalted conception of officer-of-the-court status, maintaining 
that the phrase connotes that lawyers occupy a special place within the 
judicial process and, accordingly, that there are some things that they 
simply cannot do.  This basically amounts to an “I know it when I see it” 
model.173  In In re Moncier,174 for example, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Tennessee suspended an attorney from practicing 
before it for seven years for, among other things, “refus[ing] to obey a 
court order, threaten[ing] to abandon a client during a court proceeding, 
and display[ing] disrespectful and contemptuous behavior toward[] the 
institutional role of the judge.”175  The court judged counsel’s actions 
against the officer-of-the-court standard, which it contended was triggered 
by the oath that lawyers take when being admitted in federal district 
court.176  Specifically, the court indicated that “[u]pon taking [the] oath 
and being approved for admission, attorneys become officers of the court,” 
which, at a minimum, requires them “to demean themselves as [attorneys] 
uprightly and according to law.”177  Under this measurement, certain 
conduct is unacceptable, and lawyers are expected to know this by virtue of 
their status as officers of the court.178 
The court did not offer much detail beyond this, although it did 
pointedly respond to the offending attorney’s zealous advocacy defense by 
proclaiming that “zealousness on the part of attorneys can never 
super[s]ede their obligation to the profession and the law.”179  Elevating 
this directive further, the court observed that:  
 
171. Id. at 647. 
172. Id. 
173. Cf. Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility 
As an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 141 (2011–12) (noting that 
“[i]n attempting a definition [of civility], one author went so far as to suggest that the best that can be 
said . . . is, like Justice Stewart’s assessment of pornography, that ‘you know it when you see it’”). 
174. In re Moncier, 550 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Tenn. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 636 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
175. Id. at 770. 
176. Id. at 769–70. 
177. Id. 
178. See id. (stating that lawyers are expected to conduct themselves professionally after they 
take the oath and become officers of the court). 
179. Id. at 806. 
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The idea that zealousness can be an excuse for unethical and unprofessional 
behavior is a pernicious disease that threatens to eat away at the integrity and 
nobility of the court as an institution.  Zealousness is commendable, but it is 
not and cannot ever be an acceptable excuse for unprofessional and unethical 
conduct.180  
The point seems to be that the court, as an institution, is special, and 
attorneys, as its officers, are likewise.  Appropriate respect for the lofty 
position of the judiciary is expected, and officers of the court should 
inherently know the bounds of propriety.181 
Similarly, in Rhodes v. MacDonald,182 another trial court resorted to the 
officer-of-the court label in imposing a $20,000 sanction against a 
plaintiff’s attorney under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for her 
strident pursuit of a patently frivolous lawsuit.183  In particular, the action 
consisted of an effort to prevent the plaintiff’s deployment to Afghanistan 
based on the argument that the deployment orders were invalid because 
President Obama is not a United States citizen and, therefore, is ineligible 
to hold office.184  To make matters worse, plaintiff’s counsel had 
previously filed an action of this nature with the court, which had been 
dismissed.185  The attorney’s unflinching maintenance of the present 
lawsuit, including moving for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, led 
the court to issue the sanction, accompanied by a powerfully scolding 
opinion.186 
Although the sanction was grounded in Rule 11, the court spent a 
significant amount of time emphasizing the inconsistency between 
plaintiff’s counsel’s behavior and her role as an officer of the court.187  In 
chastising the attorney for utilizing her briefs and motions to engage in 
unnecessary personal assaults on the court and opposing parties, the court 
noted that “an attorney, as an officer of the [c]ourt, has an obligation to 
use legal proceedings for the legitimate purpose of pursuing a lawful cause 
 
180. Id. 
181. See id. at 769–70 (remarking that, upon taking the oath, attorneys are expected to 
conduct themselves in accordance with professional standards, including “demonstrating respect for 
the court”). 
182. Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (M.D. Ga. 2009), aff’d, 368 F. App’x 949 
(11th Cir. 2010). 
183. Id. at 1366–68, 1384. 
184. Id. at 1366. 
185. Id. at 1366–67.  In fact, the attorney had filed similarly frivolous lawsuits in the Middle 
District of Florida and the Western District of Texas.  Id. at 1366, 1367 & n.2. 
186. Id. at 1369–70. 
187. Id. at 1378–79. 
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of action.”188  Even more significantly, the court went on to observe that 
while plaintiff’s counsel’s ad hominem attacks in the case may have been 
“good rhetoric to fuel the ‘birther agenda,’ . . . [they were] unbecoming of a 
member of the bar and an officer of the [c]ourt.”189 
Interestingly, the court’s use of the officer-of-the-court standard was not 
as a substantive behavioral measuring stick but rather as an imprecise, 
aspirational objective, which plaintiff’s counsel unquestionably failed to 
fulfill.190  The court’s overriding message seems to have been that 
attorneys’ unique status as officers of the court requires strict adherence to 
unprescribed, innate expectations.  It should not be necessary for a court to 
provide attorneys with a laundry list of officer-of-the-court “dos and 
don’ts.”191 
Along lines similar to Rhodes, other courts have adopted what may be 
characterized as a gatekeeper viewpoint of lawyers as officers of the court.  
Specifically, it is a lawyer’s obligation to ensure that only meritorious 
claims or contentions are espoused in a case.192  Clients may want to 
pursue a particular tactic no matter what, but, when necessary, it is 
counsel’s duty, as an officer of the court, to prevent this from happening.  
A prime example of this perspective can be found in Cicero v. Borg-Warner 
Automotive, Inc.193  In this age discrimination case, the court granted 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, determining that the action 
was so lacking in merit that it should have been voluntarily dismissed.194  
Although the court ultimately declined to impose a sanction on plaintiff’s 
 
188. Id. at 1378. 
189. Id. at 1378–79 (emphasis added). 
190. Indeed, the court expressly delineated that the specific actions engaged in by plaintiff’s 
counsel constituted an abuse of the privilege to practice law.  Id. at 1365.  For example, “[w]hen a 
lawyer files complaints and motions without a reasonable basis for believing that they are supported 
by existing law or a modification or extension of existing law, that lawyer abuses her privilege to 
practice law.”  Id. 
191. Relying on Justice Cardozo’s famous quote from Karlin v. Culkin, the court stated, for 
example, that: “For justice to be administered efficiently and justly, lawyers must understand the 
conditions that govern their privilege to practice law.  Lawyers who do not understand those 
conditions are at best woefully unprepared to practice the profession and at worst a menace to it.”  
Id.; see People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that membership in 
the bar makes a lawyer an officer of the court).  However, the court fails to articulate what those 
conditions are, seemingly suggesting that they are simply things that a lawyer should know. 
192. See Rhodes, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1365 (“When a lawyer files complaints and motions 
without a reasonable basis for believing that they are supported by existing law or a modification or 
extension of existing law, that lawyer abuses her privilege of practicing law.”); Cicero v. Borg-Warner 
Auto., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 743, 750 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (stating that lawyers, as officers of the 
court, have a duty to refrain from filing frivolous lawsuits). 
193. Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
194. Id. at 758. 
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lawyers, it nevertheless seized the opportunity to emphasize that: “As 
officers of the court, attorneys have obligations not just to their clients, but 
also to the court, their opponents, and society at large, to refrain not only 
from filing meritless lawsuits, but to refrain from prosecuting them once it 
becomes clear that they are without merit.”195  It is significant to note that 
the court characterized the officer-of-the-court gatekeeper duties as being 
owed not just to the court but also to the adversary and the public, adding 
yet another level of potential confusion to the label.196 
While there are undoubtedly other viewpoints regarding what it means 
to be an officer of the court,197 the various perspectives recounted in this 
section sufficiently convey the complexity of the issue and establish that 
there really is no definitive model.198  A lawyer’s role as an officer of the 
court can vary depending upon the situation involved, as well as the 
identity of the decision-maker.  When attorney conduct is patently 
egregious, the absence of a well-formed standard is not problematic 
because officers of the court clearly cannot conduct themselves in such a 
manner.199  However, when the behavior in question is on the margins, 
the lack of a rigid officer-of-the-court model becomes more challenging 
because of the lack of predictability that it portends.  The next section 
explores the potential negative effects that may flow from the currently 
ill-defined criterion. 
C. Effects of Utilization of an Ill-Defined Officer-of-the-Court Model 
Without question, there is a significant positive component to courts 
utilizing an indefinite officer-of-the-court model.  In particular, the 
awareness that one’s conduct is being judged against a lofty, unarticulated 
 
195. Id. at 750 (emphasis added). 
196. Id. 
197. See generally James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer 
of the Court”, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 358–87 (2000) (discussing thoroughly and thoughtfully the 
substance of the officer-of-the-court label); Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 
VAND. L. REV. 39, 48–76 (1989) (same). 
198. See, e.g., Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1365 (M.D. Ga. 2009) (requiring 
attorneys to adhere to unspecified duties as an officer of the court), aff’d, 368 F. App’x 949 (11th Cir. 
2010); In re Moncier, 550 F. Supp. 2d 768, 769–70 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (stating that lawyers are 
expected to conduct themselves professionally after they take the oath and become officers of the 
court), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 636 (6th Cir. 2009); Cicero, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 750 (holding that lawyers 
owe their officer-of-the-court obligations not only to the court but also opponents and the public); see 
also Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 76 (1989) (observing 
that “courts use the [officer-of-the-court] concept in a general and vague manner”). 
199. See Rhodes, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1384 (ordering sanctions for an attorney’s egregious 
actions in part because “[a] clearer case could not exist”). 
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standard could have the salutary effect of causing lawyers generally to be 
more mindful and careful about their behavior.  More to the point, the 
uncertainty regarding what actions might run afoul of this measure would 
likely force attorneys to err on the side of caution, especially when the 
penalty for a violation is a sanction or some type of disciplinary censure.  
This mindset could foster a number of positive practices among counsel, 
such as: (1) more rigid screening of potential claims, contentions, and 
defenses; (2) increased attention to ensuring the efficient progression of an 
action; and (3) greater cooperation with and collegiality toward opposing 
counsel.  From a systemic standpoint, lawyers approaching the adversarial 
process in this manner would be idyllic—creating a veritable utopian 
judicial system, devoid of frivolity, delay, chicanery, and antagonism. 
The problem with such a model, however, is that it fails to accord 
proper weight to lawyers’ client-centered obligations and, as a result, may 
unduly compromise their ability to advocate zealously and effectively on 
behalf of clients.  Specifically, it is possible that the unpredictability of the 
indefinite officer-of-the-court approach could cause attorneys to be not 
just cautious, but overly cautious, elevating their concerns for the court, 
the system, the public, and themselves over the interests of their clients.  In 
other words, the standard may make counsel second-guess legitimate 
adversarial strategies out of fear of getting on the wrong side of the court.  
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that any officer-of-the-court duties 
recognized by courts will necessarily take priority over client-centered 
obligations when there is a conflict.200  An added concern is the prospect 
for unequal enforcement of the malleable standard.  Judges, like all 
individuals, are susceptible to conscious and unconscious biases, which 
may find expression in the manner in which they wield the officer-of-the-
court label.201 
 
200. See Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1546 (11th Cir. 1993) (“All attorneys, 
as ‘officers of the court,’ owe duties of complete candor and primary loyalty to the court before which 
they practice.  An attorney’s duty to a client can never outweigh his or her responsibility to see that 
our system of justice functions smoothly.”); In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 487–88 (Del. 2007) (per 
curiam) (“This responsibility to the ‘[c]ourt’ takes precedence over the interests of the client because 
officers of the [c]ourt are obligated to represent these clients zealously within the bounds of both the 
positive law and the rules of ethics.” (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168 (1986))); Langen v. 
Borkowski, 206 N.W. 181, 190 (Wis. 1925) (creating a similar officer-of-the-court standard); see also 
Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 48 (1989) (observing that 
the “primary distinguishing characteristic of the duties making up the officer[-]of[-]the[-]court 
obligation . . . must be their subordination of the interests of the client and the lawyer to those of the 
judicial system and the public”). 
201. See Amy R. Mashburn, Making Civility Democratic, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (2011) 
(observing that the “refusal to unpack the ‘officer of the court’ and ‘law is not a business’ ideals has 
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In many cases, the possible problems associated with an ill-defined 
officer-of-the-court model will not be present—namely, those situations 
where an attorney’s conduct is patently inappropriate, like some of the 
examples discussed in the previous section.202  There, sanctioning or 
otherwise censuring a lawyer for failure to live up to his or her role as an 
officer of the court, in essence, simply states the obvious and highlights the 
impropriety of what has been done.  The lawyers should have known 
better, and using the label to emphasize this point does not in any way 
undermine legitimate zealous representation. 
The problems will arise in cases where the conduct that purportedly 
offends the officer-of-the-court standard is comprised of actions that 
lawyers may legitimately undertake on behalf of a client.  Sahyers is 
obviously the quintessential example of this.  No lawyer could have 
predicted that his or her duties as an officer of the court entailed providing 
lawyer-defendants with pre-suit notice in the interest of civility and 
collegiality.  And the prospect that other courts may see fit to recognize 
similar unforeseeable court or adversary-centered obligations militates 
rather strongly against the maintenance of an ill-defined 
officer-of-the-court model. 
A reasonable response may be that Sahyers is merely an aberration, and 
the Eleventh Circuit panel’s narrowing gymnastics sufficiently ensure that 
its example will not be emulated.203  Unfortunately, as Judge Wilson 
observed in his dissent from the denial of the rehearing en banc, there is 
nothing to prevent courts from adopting the specific pre-suit notice duty 
recognized by the panel, let alone the analytical framework that gave rise to 
the creation of that obligation.204  Courts are free to replicate it.  
Moreover, Sahyers is not the lone case to have used an officer-of-the-court 
 
the effect of allowing the Bar to advocate enforcement of open-ended norms that are not the subject 
of legislative deliberation or even much informal debate” (citing Bruce A. Green & Fred C. 
Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 289 (2006))).  Masburn 
goes on to state that “[t]his is an ideal environment for judges to put into effect, consciously or 
unconsciously, their expectations about entitlement to deference.”  Id. 
202. See In re Moncier, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (suspending an attorney for “refus[ing] to obey 
a court order, threaten[ing] to abandon a client during a court proceeding, and display[ing] 
disrespectful and contemptuous behavior towards the institutional role of the judge”); supra Part V.B 
(discussing recent cases that have reverted back to the more esoteric conception of officer-of-the-court 
status). 
203. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2009) (limiting the reach of Sahyers by 
stating that the decision was fact-intensive), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010). 
204. See Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 894 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Wilson, J., dissenting) 
(“Sahyers . . . provides binding precedent for a district court to ignore a clear Congressional mandate 
from a federal statute based on its ‘inherent powers.’”). 
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standard to impose an unwritten and unforeseeable duty that conflicts with 
a legitimate adversarial position.205 
In Smith v. Johnston,206 the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed setting 
aside a default judgment because plaintiff’s counsel was found to have 
engaged in “conduct . . . prejudicial to the administration of justice,”207 a 
standard perhaps even more malleable than the ill-defined 
officer-of-the-court measure.208  Specifically, the court found that the 
lawyer’s failure to provide opposing counsel with notice of her intent to 
pursue a default judgment was prejudicial to the administration of justice 
and warranted the setting aside of that judgment under Indiana Trial 
Rule 60(b)(3) for attorney misconduct.209 
Smith involved a medical malpractice action that required a plaintiff to 
submit his or her claim to a medical review panel for approval as a 
prerequisite to filing suit.210  In connection with this process, plaintiff’s 
counsel became aware that the defendants were represented by counsel.211  
Indeed, following the medical review panel’s approval of the claim, 
plaintiff’s counsel sent a written settlement demand to defendants’ 
attorneys, a rejection of which was received on the very day that the suit 
was filed.212 
Plaintiff’s counsel properly served the defendants with the summons and 
complaint in the action but did not send copies thereof to the defendants’ 
counsel.213  The court acknowledged that this approach and the plaintiff’s 
counsel’s subsequent failure to provide opposing counsel with notice of the 
pursuit of a default judgment were in full compliance with the pertinent 
 
205. See, e.g., Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1263–64 (Ind. 1999) (recognizing 
unwritten duties inherent in being an officer of the court). 
206. Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. 1999). 
207. Id. at 1264. 
208. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 65.6 (3d ed. Supp. 
2009) (observing that while Rule 8.4(d) largely overlaps with other litigation-oriented Rules of 
Professional Conduct, “it may signify the existence of other, as yet undefined, offenses against a 
tribunal or against the administration of justice”).  “While some flexibility in defining disciplinary 
offenses is desirable, in order to ensure that novel forms of misconduct do not fall between the cracks, 
an open-ended rule is dangerous.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  Notwithstanding its facial vagueness, Rule 
8.4(d) has survived numerous constitutional challenges for vagueness and overbreadth.  ELLEN J. 
BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 626 (7th ed. 2011)). 
209. Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1260–61. 
210. Id. at 1261; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-8-4 (Lexis Nexis 2008) (“[A]n action 
against a health care provider may not be commenced in a court in Indiana before: (1) the claimant’s 
proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel established under 
IC 34-18-10 . . . and (2) an opinion is given by the panel.”). 
211. Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1261. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
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procedural rules of the court.214  Nonetheless, the court concluded that 
these rules did not contemplate the possibility of a plaintiff’s attorney 
possessing knowledge of a defendant’s representation by counsel, as was 
the situation here.215  According to the court, plaintiff’s counsel’s 
knowledge gave “rise to a corresponding duty under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct to provide notice before seeking any relief from the 
court.”216  Though admittedly not stated in the text of any particular rule, 
the court emphasized that:  
[L]awyers’ duties are found not only in the specific rules of conduct and rules 
of procedure, but also in courtesy, common sense[,] and the constraints of 
our judicial system.  As an officer of the [c]ourt, every lawyer must avoid 
compromising the integrity of his or her own reputation and that of the legal 
process itself.  These considerations alone demand that [plaintiff’s counsel] 
take the relatively simple step of placing a phone call to [defendant’s counsel] 
before seeking a default judgment.217  
Despite this statement suggesting that the notification duty somehow 
arose from the inherent officer-of-the-court responsibilities of a lawyer, the 
court proceeded to link the obligation to Rule 8.4(d) of Indiana’s Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which states that it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.218  
Specifically, the court held that “[t]he administration of justice requires 
that parties and their known lawyers be given notice of a lawsuit prior to 
seeking a default judgment.”219  Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to undertake 
reasonable steps to notify defendants’ counsel, under the circumstances, 
therefore ran afoul of this rule and warranted the setting aside of the 
default judgment.220 
 
214. See id. at 1263 (“We agree with [plaintiff’s counsel] that Trial Rule 4 calls for service of 
the summons and complaint on the party, not the attorney, to secure jurisdiction.  We also agree that 
Trial Rule 5(B) requires service of subsequent papers only on attorneys who have filed their 
appearance in the case.”). 
215. See id. (observing that the rules “anticipate that a defendant in a lawsuit may not have 
retained an attorney at the time suit is filed,” and even if that is not the case, the plaintiff may not be 
aware of this). 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 1263–64 (emphasis added). 
218. Id. at 1264.  The court also made reference to the Preamble to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  See id. at 1263 (recognizing that “[t]he Rules, do not, however, exhaust the moral and 
ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be 
completely defined by legal rules.” (quoting IND. R. PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., available at 
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/prof_conduct/#_Toc313019170) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))). 
219. Id. at 1264. 
220. Id. 
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While the result in Smith is certainly understandable—as was true in 
Sahyers—the court’s analytical approach is quite troubling.  To be sure, it 
would have been civil or collegial for plaintiff’s lawyer to have given 
defense counsel notice about the filing of the lawsuit and the pursuit of a 
default judgment.221  However, the fact that no express rule required such 
notification definitely put plaintiff’s counsel in a precarious position, 
particularly because she was in full compliance with the pertinent 
procedural rules.222  The attorney’s legal position, under all available, 
tangible litigation measures, was legitimate.223  To penalize her and her 
client under these circumstances, based on a previously unarticulated duty, 
seems unfair, at best.  Additionally, the court’s strained attempt to ground 
its holding in an actual rule appears intended to address the concern of 
subjecting counsel to a yet-to-be-recognized professional obligation.224  
The court’s effort in this regard, though, falls woefully short in light of its 
selection of perhaps the vaguest standard contained in the Rules of 
Professional Conduct as the source for this officer-of-the-court type 
duty.225 
Sahyers and Smith undoubtedly are not the only cases that involve courts 
creating new duties out of general conceptions of lawyers’ status as officers 
of the court.226  But even if they are, their existence alone is enough to 
establish the looming possibility that other courts may follow suit in the 
future.  As a result, attorneys’ ability to advocate zealously and effectively 
on behalf of their clients may be hindered by undue concern for the 
interests of the court, the opposition, the public, or even themselves.  This 
 
221. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2009) (requiring pre-suit notice in part 
because it would promote civility among lawyers (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 
(1991); In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990))), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 
(2010). 
222. See Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1262–64 (recognizing that plaintiff’s attorney’s conduct was 
consistent with the pertinent trial rules). 
223. See id. (recognizing that plaintiff’s attorney had complied with the requirements of the 
applicable trial rules). 
224. See id. at 1263–64 (using Rule 8.4(d)’s vague “administration of justice” clause to justify 
the holding). 
225. For a case reaching a result contrary to Smith, see Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 775 
S.W.2d 97, 100–01 (Mo. 1989) (holding plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to advise defense counsel of the 
entry of a default judgment until after it was no longer likely to be set aside as a matter of course to 
be an invalid basis for setting the judgment aside), superseded by MO. R. CIV. P. 74.05, as recognized 
in Cont’l Basketball Ass’n v. Harrisburg Prof’l Sports Inc., 947 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).  
But see id. at 109–12 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting) (condemning plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct in taking 
advantage of defense counsel’s mistaken belief that the case was pending, rather than in default). 
226. Cf. Dondi Props. Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 288–89 (N.D. 
Tex. 1988) (per curiam) (adopting standards of litigation conduct for lawyers appearing before the 
court apart from existing ethical and procedural rules). 
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potentially serious adverse effect on attorneys’ client-centered 
responsibilities can be significantly mitigated by adopting a model that is 
wedded to existing, clearly articulated procedural and ethical norms. 
Notably, in Sahyers, Judge Wilson, in his dissent from the request for 
rehearing en banc, emphasized as problematic the absence of any rule or 
statute regarding the pre-suit notice duty recognized by the Eleventh 
Circuit panel.227  Judge Barkett, in her dissent, raised a similar point, 
noting that plaintiff’s counsel was entitled to some type of prior notice 
regarding the specific officer-of-the-court requirement which he was 
deemed to have violated.228  Part VI takes these critiques to heart and 
proposes that officer-of-the-court ideals should be emphasized and 
enforced only through existing procedural and professional constraints on 
lawyer conduct. 
VI.     A BETTER APPROACH: DEFINING OFFICER-OF-THE-COURT IDEALS 
THROUGH EXISTING PROCEDURAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
Highlighting the fact that a lawyer is an officer of the court, in addition 
to being a client’s advocate, is important, and courts should continue to 
remind counsel of this essential component of bar membership, as did the 
Eleventh Circuit panel in Sahyers.  It is critical, however, to establish ex 
ante definitional parameters for officer-of-the-court-based duties to avoid 
unduly hamstringing lawyers’ legitimate client-centered advocacy. 
Of all the approaches to defining what it means to be an officer of the 
court, the formulation contained in Black’s Law Dictionary best captures 
the essence of what this Article views as the optimal methodology for 
practically and effectively emphasizing and enforcing officer-of-the-court 
ideals without compromising a lawyer’s ability to pursue legitimate 
adversarial objectives.229  In particular, Black’s ties a lawyer’s status as an 
officer of the court to two related duties: (1) the duty to obey court rules; 
and (2) the “duty of candor to the court.”230  The only caveat that this 
 
227. See Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 894–95 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Wilson, J., dissenting) 
(observing that the majority failed to cite any rule that imposes this duty). 
228. See id. at 891 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“District courts do not have the authority to 
sanction lawyers for conduct not proscribed by law or rule—which is the case here—without first 
providing them with notice that their conduct may warrant sanctions.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 
83(b))). 
229. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009) (providing that a lawyer’s obligations 
as an officer of the court are to obey court rules and to provide candor to the court). 
230. Id.  The duty of candor finds content both in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 
(requiring that attorneys certify that papers presented to the court are nonfrivolous and not 
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Article would add is that “court rules” should be interpreted to include 
rules of professional conduct that pertain to the litigation process,231 as 
well as applicable rules of procedure.232  If a duty cannot be linked to such 
pre-existing, clearly identifiable court rules, then a court should not be 
permitted to resort to the officer-of-the-court mantra to manufacture it. 
One might argue that this would inappropriately circumscribe courts’ 
ability to ensure the efficient administration of the judicial process through 
the exercise of their time-honored inherent authority to regulate the 
practice of law.233  While the approach endorsed here would admittedly 
restrict courts’ ability to utilize purely inherent authority to contend with 
officer-of-the-court-based attorney misconduct, it should not adversely 
affect their overall capacity to address such behavior.  Indeed, various 
courts have given content to the officer-of-the-court standard by directly 
linking it to such provisions as litigation-focused standards contained in 
the Rules of Professional Conduct and certain Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.234  In doing so, these courts were still able to respond 
effectively and fairly to improper attorney conduct.235 
 
interposed for an improper purpose); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002) (imposing 
a duty of candor towards tribunals). 
231. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002) (“Meritorious Claims and 
Contentions”); id. R. 3.2 (“Expediting Litigation”); id. R. 3.3 (“Candor Toward the Tribunal”); id. 
R. 3.4 (“Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel”); id. R. 3.5 (“Impartiality and Decorum of the 
Tribunal”); see also Amy R. Mashburn, Making Civility Democratic, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1164–
65 (2011) (discussing various rules of professional conduct used by courts to give content to a 
standard for judging incivility as revealed in empirical study of cases). 
232. See Four Star Fin. Servs., LLC v. Commonwealth Mgmt. Ass’n, 166 F. Supp. 2d 805, 807 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (using Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 as a point of reference for the substance 
of the officer-of-the-court label); see also Amy R. Mashburn, Making Civility Democratic, 47 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1147, 1163 (2011) (discussing courts’ use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 28 
U.S.C. § 1927 to give content to standard for judging incivility as revealed in empirical study of 
cases). 
233. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2009) (maintaining that a court’s inherent 
powers include “the authority to police lawyer conduct and to guard and to promote civility and 
collegiality among the members of its bar”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010); see also Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991) (exploring the scope of the court’s inherent power to police 
litigants’ conduct). 
234. See, e.g., GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 252 F.R.D. 253, 257–58 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (relying 
upon the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 
sanction a lawyer for abusive behavior); Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 98 CIV 
10175(JSM), 2002 WL 59434, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002) (linking Rule 11 with an attorney’s 
officer-of-the-court duties), aff’d, 317 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2003). 
235. See, e.g., GMAC Bank, 252 F.R.D. at 254 (using existing rules of civil procedure to 
sanction “outrageous” and “inexcusable” conduct during a deposition (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Patsy’s Brand, 2002 WL 59434, at *4, 5 (utilizing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to 
sanction a party for providing false statements via its counsel and fabricating documents). 
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In GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp.,236 for example, the court relied, in 
part, upon Rules 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 8.4 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Professional Conduct, as well as Rules 30 and 37 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, in sanctioning a defense attorney for failing to take 
appropriate action to curtail his client’s excessively abusive behavior during 
his deposition.237  During a telephone conference regarding the matter, 
the court expressed its concern with counsel’s inaction by couching it in 
terms of his duty as an officer of the court, as defined by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.238  Specifically, the court maintained that “under 
the Code of Professional Conduct, counsel has certain obligations as an 
officer of the court which must be harmonized with counsel’s obligations 
to provide zealous representation.”239  The court went on to observe that, 
by sitting idly by while his client engaged in behavior “designed to obstruct 
the proceedings,” defense counsel may have violated “Rules of Professional 
Conduct 3.4, 3.5[,] and 8.4.”240  It later expanded the number of rules 
that counsel may have violated to include Rules 3.2 and 3.3, along with 
the pertinent procedural rules related to discovery abuse.241  The sanction, 
however, was ultimately only tied to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure—specifically, Rules 30(d)(2) and 37(a)(5)(A).242 
Interestingly, this particular opinion addressed defense counsel’s motion 
to reconsider the sanction imposed upon him, based primarily on the 
argument that he had not been given adequate notice that his conduct was 
being assessed under the procedural rules.243  It is significant to note that 
the court acknowledged the requirement in the Third Circuit, and 
elsewhere, that a “party against whom sanctions are being considered is 
entitled to notice of the legal rule on which the sanctions would be based, the 
reasons for the sanctions, and the form of the potential sanctions.”244  What is 
 
236. GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 252 F.R.D. 253 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
237. Id. at 257–58. 
238. Id. at 255. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 257. 
242. Id. at 258. 
243. Id. at 254. 
244. Id. at 259 (quoting In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 380 (3d Cir. 
1997), abrogated on other grounds by Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198 (1999)); 
see also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 236 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing that “[t]he Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment [generally] requires a federal court to provide notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before sanctions are imposed on a litigant or attorney” (first alteration in 
original) (quoting Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1262 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))).  The court in GMAC Bank ultimately denied defense counsel’s motion to reconsider, 
finding, in part, that he had been provided ample notice of the potential bases for the sanction, thus 
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most important about this generally accepted requirement for purposes of 
the proposed approach is that it reflects an expectation that an identifiable 
rule will provide the basis for a sanction, which necessarily means that 
attorneys will have advanced notice of whatever duty they are alleged to 
have breached or, at a minimum, will have the ability to ascertain that 
duty. 
In another case, Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc.,245 a court 
linked attorneys’ officer-of-the-court duties to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11.246  The court concluded that the lawyers violated Rule 11 
by permitting their client to submit a false affidavit and in doing so 
observed that “[f]ew responsibilities of an attorney, as an officer of the 
court, are more important than the duty to insure that his client does not 
commit perjury or obstruct justice.”247 
Similarly, in Four Star Financial Services, LLC v. Commonwealth 
Management Ass’n,248 the court used Rule 11 as a point of reference for 
the substance of the officer-of-the-court label.249  In particular, in 
discussing the Rule 11 standard, the court observed that as officers of the 
court, attorneys must “properly temper[] enthusiasm for a client’s cause 
with careful regard for the obligations of truth, candor, accuracy, and 
professional judgment.”250 
Apart from these examples, which suggest that much of the conduct that 
arguably offends courts’ officer-of-the-court sensibilities can be addressed 
through extant rule-based standards, it is critical to point out that the 
Supreme Court has essentially already declared that this is the preferred 
method in federal court.  Specifically, in the seminal inherent authority 
case, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,251 the Court held that “when there is 
bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately 
sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules 
rather than [its] inherent power.”252  The Court did proceed to note, 
however, that “if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the 
 
affording him a meaningful opportunity to respond.  GMAC Bank, 252 F.R.D. at 255. 
245. Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 98 CIV 10175(JSM), 2002 WL 59434 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002), aff’d, 317 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2003). 
246. Id. at *5. 
247. Id. 
248. Four Star Fin. Servs., LLC v. Commonwealth Mgmt. Ass’n, 166 F. Supp. 2d 805 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
249. Id. at 807. 
250. Id. (quoting Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1267 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
251. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). 
252. Id. at 50. 
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statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its 
inherent power.”253  In any event, it is apparent that federal courts are 
cautioned to exercise their inherent authority sparingly, at most.254  
Hence, defining officer-of-the-court ideals in the manner endorsed here, in 
reality, should not significantly alter the current sanctioning landscape, at 
least not in the federal arena. 
Moreover, to the extent that certain types of misconduct do not 
currently fall within existing legal or ethical provisions—and there should 
not be many—there is certainly nothing that prevents courts from creating 
a positive rule that covers the situation.  In other words, if a duty is of 
sufficient importance to fall within a lawyer’s officer-of-the-court 
responsibilities, then it should be formally enacted as a court rule to be 
applied prospectively.255 
Again, it is important to emphasize that the suggested approach is 
geared towards circumstances on the margins, in which lawyers’ conduct is 
arguably appropriate under pertinent legal and ethical principles, but 
nevertheless is deemed by courts to somehow offend their role as officers of 
the court.  In these types of situations, as in Sahyers and Smith, attorneys, 
as advocates, are entitled to some sort of concrete notice to enable them to 
properly calibrate their responsibilities to the court, the opposition, and 
the system with those owed to their clients.256  Only in this manner can 
the officer-of-the-court label be imbued with practical substance, enabling 
courts to summon it in a professionally constructive and fair fashion. 
 
253. Id.; see id. at 64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (maintaining that “[i]nherent powers are the 
exception, not the rule, and their assertion requires special justification in each case”). 
254. See id. at 50 (majority opinion) (recognizing that a court must “exercise caution in 
invoking its inherent power”). 
255. It is important to note that the author fully accepts that there may be certain officer-of-
the-court situations that nevertheless warrant a court’s invocation of its inherent authority.  However, 
those situations, in the words of Justice Kennedy, should be “the exception, not the rule.”  Id. at 64 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Justice Kennedy went on to observe that “as the number and scope of 
Rules and statutes governing litigation misconduct increases, the necessity to resort to inherent 
authority . . . lessens.”  Id. at 70. 
256. See Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 236 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing that only with 
notice and an opportunity to be heard “can a party respond to the court’s concerns in an intelligent 
manner” (quoting In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 379 (3d Cir. 1997), 
abrogated on other grounds by Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198 (1999))); see also 
Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 891 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (stating that 
“district courts do not have the authority to sanction lawyers for conduct not proscribed by law or 
rule—which is the case here—without first providing them with notice that their conduct may 
warrant sanctions.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b))); Sahyers II, 603 F.3d 888, 894 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing against the court’s recognition of a new duty after failing 
to cite any identifiable rule with which this duty could be linked). 
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VII.     CONCLUSION 
 
Most would wholeheartedly agree that the central message of Sahyers v. 
Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L., as an ideal, is a sound one—i.e., the 
profession, the legal system, and the public good are all better served by the 
exhibition of greater civility and collegiality by lawyers towards one 
another.257  Similar support, no doubt, exists for the general proposition 
that the officer-of-the-court label serves as a laudable reminder that 
lawyers’ professional responsibility encompasses more than myopic 
adherence to the interests of clients and the zealous pursuit of their 
adversarial objectives. 
Utilization of this standard by courts, however, to qualify 
yet-to-be-articulated judicial expectations, like in Sahyers, is neither sound 
nor praiseworthy.  Rather, its ominous prospect has the potential to 
unreasonably compromise counsel’s ability to fulfill legitimate 
client-centered obligations.  This is certainly not to say, though, that courts 
should eschew lofty expectations with regard to the manner in which 
counsel comport themselves.  Such expectations, particularly in the areas of 
civility and collegiality, are a good thing, and courts should continue to 
utilize and emphasize attorneys’ roles as officers of the court as a means of 
characterizing these ideals. 
The only suggestion that this Article makes relates to a preferred 
methodology for enforcing a court’s high expectations.258  The 
recommended additional step of identifying a specific ethical or procedural 
rule as a prerequisite to invocation of the officer-of-the-court standard will 
ensure that attorneys have a meaningful opportunity, ex ante, to balance 
important client-centered responsibilities against those appropriately owed 
to the judicial system, the public, and the profession. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
257. See Sahyers I, 560 F.3d 1241, 1245 n.5 (11th Cir. 2009) (promoting civility and 
collegiality as a method to advance judicial efficiency and promote the public interest), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 415 (2010). 
258. See generally supra Part VI (advocating linking existing rules to officer-of-the-court duties). 
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